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Chapter One
Introduction

The doctrine of divine impassibility has fallen on hard times in recent years. After
serving as a mainstay in Christian theology from the days of the church fathers through
the nineteenth century it was largely abandoned in the twentieth century, becoming
almost as widely rejected as it had once been accepted. There were a number of reasons
for this development: the rise of process theology, the Hegelian influence that held sway
over many continental theologians, the historical “Hellenization thesis” proposed by
Adolf von Harnack at the turn of the twentieth century, the concerns about theodicy
which arose following two horrific world wars, and the rise of sympathy as an ethical
necessity1 all made significant contributions to this decline.
This thesis will focus on defining the doctrine of impassibility and defending it
against some of the objections which have arisen from many sides. Positively, divine
impassibility will be defined as God’s being beyond suffering in his nature and unable to
be coerced by anything outside of himself. It does not deny the existence of something
analogous to an emotional state within God, but it does deny this state can be changed by
anything that is not God. God exists in a perpetual state of impassible joy and invites
humanity to be caught up in God’s joy and experience it for themselves.
One category of objection centers around Christology. If the incarnation and
crucifixion of Christ is to be significant theologically, then (even if the two natures

1

This is an oft ignored but significant influence on the rejection of divine impassibility. Jennifer A.
Herdt, “The Rise of Sympathy and the Question of Divine Suffering,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 29,
no. 3 (2001): 367–399 makes a strong case for this move as highly influential among the eighteenth century
Anglican theologians who were among the first to reject impassibility.
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remain distinct without confusion) the divine nature must truly experience what it is to be
human, which includes undergoing passions. Further, due to the centrality of the
crucifixion of Christ to the faith, God must really and truly suffer in that moment. Most
passibilists argue for an interpretation of the cross which locates divine suffering not only
in the second person of the Trinity who is crucified, but also in the Father. The Father,
who has been Father from all eternity, suffers the loss of the Son. This is not only a loss
of Godself, but also creates a crisis of identity for the Father as he loses the one whose
relation causes him to be known as “Father.”2 The response to the Christological question
will focus on the exemplary early theological work of Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria
in formulating the communicatio idiomatum, which offers an explanation of how Christ
could be both the impassible God and fully human. This formulation will also solve the
question of suffering in the incarnation: because of the communication of idioms between
the two natures of Christ, Cyril’s declaration can be affirmed: the Logos suffered
impassibly.3 Rather than devote an entire chapter to this question, it will be treated along
with the definition of impassibility given in chapter one.
While it would be impossible to answer each individual criticism of the doctrine,
there are three other key categories of objections which will be answered in the study.
The first category is theodicy. Critics of impassibility insist no coherent explanation for
the suffering and evil in creation can exist if God does not suffer alongside creation. This
view is presented in Jurgen Moltmann’s The Crucified God, one of the most influential
twentieth century works promoting divine suffering. Moltmann, a former German soldier
2

Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of
Christian Theology, trans. by John Bowden and R.A. Wilson (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 151-153;
203-206.
3

Cyril, Third Letter to Nestorius 6.
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in the Second World War, could not fathom the existence of an impassible God in the
world after seeing his hometown destroyed by Allied bombs and the horrors his
countrymen exacted on the Jewish people in the holocaust. In the face of the suffering
and horror wrought in his creation throughout history, the only adequate response in this
view is to posit a God who is experiencing suffering alongside creation. There can be no
solution to the problem of evil if God is impassive and therefore indifferent to the pain of
humanity. The theodicy question will be answered by examining what happens when
suffering becomes an integral part of God’s love; that is, if God becomes something he is
not through an encounter with suffering, suffering logically becomes a necessary part of
history. Gone is the doctrine of evil as privatio boni (privation of the good)—if suffering
is necessary for God, it becomes a necessary aspect of reality and therefore God is the
author and even foundation for evil’s existence. So, rather than saving theodicy, the
suffering of God turns God into the reason for humanity’s pain.
The second category of objection is the historical critique. This objection, in some
of its simpler formulations, commits the genetic fallacy. It claims the concept of divine
impassibility originates in Greek philosophy and therefore cannot be of use in Christian
theology. The claim that impassibility originated in certain Greek schools does not
necessarily entail it is incommensurable with Christian theology if impassibility is a valid
category to express certain ideas present in Christian theology. However, if the doctrine
of impassibility represents a corruption of the original “pure” gospel preached by Jesus
which was corrupted in some subsequent point in the history of the church (as Harnack
claimed), it must be rejected as incompatible with authentic Christianity. Therefore, the
witness of the early church fathers (and indeed, almost all medieval and early modern
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theology) regarding divine impassibility stems from this corruption of the gospel. The
historical critique has largely been rejected in recent years, following the work of
scholars like Paul Gavrilyuk, David Bentley Hart, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Thomas
Weinandy. Despite their convincing work, there are still many who peddle some form of
the “Hellenization thesis.” Thus, the thesis will survey the influence of the Hellenization
thesis in the work of notable theologians and respond to a more recent instantiation of
this historical objection in Greg Boyd’s two-volume Crucifixion of the Warrior God.4
The third category of objection concerns the possibility of God’s love and relation
to creation. For God to be truly loving, he must be moved to experience emotions by
things his people do. How could humans talk of God being delighted or disappointed in
them if they cannot cause any change in his emotions? After all, the human love for
another is accompanied by feelings. If God’s emotions remain untouched by human
efforts to please or human failures to remain faithful, God is not truly loving. Not only is
such a God incapable of loving, it seems that there is no real relationship between the
impassible God and creation. Relationality, like love, requires one party to be able to act
upon the other. So, it is argued, the impassible God cannot be the God of the Christian
message because the God described in Scripture is love. This objection will be answered
through an appeal to the metaphysics of participation, wherein everything that exists does
so through a gracious donation of being from God. God is the source of all being, and as
such nothing can exist without God’s act of imparting existence upon it. Thus, as
Augustine said, “[God is] more inward than my most inward part and higher than the

Gregory A. Boyd, The Crucifixion of the Warrior God: Interpreting the Old Testament’s Violent
Portraits of God in the Light of the Cross, vol. 2, The Cruciform Thesis (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017).
4
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highest element within me.”5 God’s ubiquity and status as the one who is pure act with no
passive potentialities precludes an understanding of him as a distant, impassive observer.
This study will engage each of these objections, taking one or two representatives of each
critique and answering their primary objections with an emphasis on how the objections
either misconstrue the doctrine or can be resolved through a more careful formulation.

Theological Foundations
An important distinction to be made in this discussion is the one drawn by Brian
Davies between “classical theism” and “theistic personalism.”6 Classical theism is
exemplified in the Christian tradition by figures like Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, and
Thomas Aquinas and in other religious and philosophical traditions by Plato, Plotinus,
Maimonides, Avicenna, and Averroes, among others. Classical theism conceives of God
as the metaphysically ultimate source of all being (comporting with the Christian doctrine
of creatio ex nihilo), the one who is identified with being-itself, and the source of all
being. Further, this God is metaphysically simple, timeless, immutable, impassible,
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. The transcendentals of truth, goodness, and
beauty do not merely describe God; God is the source and standard of each, and as such
all truth, goodness, and beauty on earth point back to God. For the Christian classical
theist, God is love (1 Jn. 4:7, 16), but God is also truth, goodness, and beauty. The
confession “God is good” does not attribute goodness to God as a characteristic but
identifies goodness itself as an essential aspect of his nature. This thesis will defend the

5
6

Augustine, Confessions 3.6.11.

Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 9.
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classical theist position on divine impassibility and attempt to show how impassibility
follows as a natural corollary from the other assertions about God’s nature found in
classical theism.
Theistic personalism, in opposition to classical theism, is a broader category
encompassing a variety of positions. It includes analytic philosophers of religion like
William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga, who deny certain classical doctrines like divine
simplicity or timelessness but retain belief in divine omniscience, omnipotence, and
qualified immutability. It includes the “openness of God” (open theist) camp who view
God as time-bound and deny he knows all things.7 It also includes process theologians
and philosophers who conceive of God essentially as a human writ large, lacking
omniscience, omnipotence, and full perfection.8 Significantly, theistic personalism
conceives of God not as being-itself but as a being existing on a similar ontological plane
as humanity. God is the most powerful, glorious, and benevolent being in existence but is
still a being. Richard Swinburne, a theistic personalist, describes the theist’s
understanding of God as “something like a ‘person without a body.’”9 While this may be
a fitting colloquial description for God, such a definition (which characterizes the theistic
personalist position) cannot conceive of God as “being-itself,” leaving it at odds with
classical theism.
The central issue for many theistic personalists regarding classical theism,
particularly analytic philosophers of religion, is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Based

7
Some open theists deny omniscience, while others affirm God knows all things that can be known but
deny that future free actions of individuals cannot be known.
8

While process theology is a form of theistic personalism, it will not be addressed in this project due to
the radical difference between classical and process theisms (see The Direction of the Study section.)
9

Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1.
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on the personalist identification of God as a being whose inner life and relationality can
be conceived of in the same way humans can, the idea of a God who is simple—devoid
of parts both physical and metaphysical—seems incoherent. Alvin Plantinga exemplifies
this in his discussion of divine simplicity. He argues divine simplicity entails that God “is
a property,” but because a property could not have “created the world [or] be
omniscient,” God cannot be simple.10 This sort of approach to the classical doctrine
renders simplicity untenable. Due to the interdependence of the divine attributes in
classical theism, the rejection of simplicity leads to a rejection of many other classical
attributes, including impassibility. It is less common for classical theism to be rejected
with impassibility as the catalyst for such a rejection,11 but those who reject simplicity
often come up with subsequent arguments to attack impassibility.
This discussion also raises the difficult question of the relation between language
and being. The theistic personalist would conceive of being as univocal: attributes can be
predicated of God in the same way they are to humans. To say, “God loves me” and
“John loves me” expresses the same phenomenon. God loves just like John loves, albeit
in a perfect way. Classical theism, on the other hand, understands being as analogical.
There are similarities between the way God loves and the way John loves, but they are
not the same thing. Because God is the ineffable and infinite source of all being,
unchanging, and existing timelessly, humans cannot predicate attributes of him in
precisely the same way because God does not interact with and relate to the world in the
same way humans do. This study will engage in talk about God from this analogical

10
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Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 47.

However, it is not uncommon. Such rejections usually come from those who, like Moltmann, cannot
conceive of an impassible deity in a suffering world.
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position, employing the important work of Erich Przywara in his influential work
Analogia Entis and its subsequent interpreters.

The Direction of the Study
This study will assume the existence of God and the significance of rightly
understanding the doctrine of divine impassibility for a coherent theology. It will not
assume the truth of the classical view of God and will work to display the superiority of
such a system. However, it will assume the coherence of the doctrines entailed by
classical theism (i.e. divine simplicity, immutability, impassibility, and so on) cohere
with one another if the foundational assumptions of classical theism are correct.
One significant limitation placed on the scope of the study will be in the selection
of interlocutors. Although process theology is a significant voice in opposition to divine
impassibility, no process theologian will be engaged at length on these chosen objections.
Due to the large gulf between process thought and classical theism, there are too few
points of contact to create meaningful dialogue on one issue. Since process theism entails
a rejection of simplicity, immutability, timelessness, omniscience, and omnipotence, its
proponents are less than ideal as interlocutors. The study will concern itself only with
theologians who deny impassibility but still wish to maintain a belief in other attributes
affirmed by classical theism, such as omnipotence or omniscience.
Further, the chapters on key objections will be limited to one or two main
proponents of the objections. Other scholars can be included as supplementary material—
such as in the chapter on the historical question, where contemporary theologians will be
included to explore the ways Harnack’s nineteenth century thesis still influences
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theology—but the main points of the arguments will derive from the work of one or two
scholars. The representatives chosen will be major voices in the conversation whose work
is widely read and frequently employed in the (im)passibility debate. Some preference
will be given to more recent voices in the conversation, but because the debates around
impassibility were most prevalent in the latter half of the twentieth century (following the
publication of Moltmann’s Crucified God), some of the major works studied will be from
that era.

Methodology
The methodology for gathering data in this study will largely entail the use
historical and contemporary primary sources. Secondary sources will be used on
occasion, particularly for the chapter on the historical question due to the wide-ranging
discussion on the topic in the last 120 years of scholarship and the large scope of the
question. Because the historical argument does not identify the “Hellenization” of
Christian theology with any one consistent time or figure, the use of exclusively primary
sources is difficult. The core arguments of the project in favor of divine impassibility will
be relatively original, not relying exactly on any one figure for their formulation.
Relevant discussions by theologians who affirm impassibility will be used to supplement
the arguments given, but no one scholar will be relied on exclusively.

Chapter Two
Defining Impassibility

It is important to begin with a definition of impassibility, as the assumption of a
shared meaning between writer and reader is fraught with danger. This is particularly true
in conversations regarding divine impassibility, as the term has held a variety of
meanings in its usage by various adherents and detractors1 sometimes even including, of
all things, passibility.2 For the purposes of this project, impassibility will be defined as
God’s being beyond suffering, God’s ability to act without coercion from subjects who
are not God, and God’s freedom from being affected by evil. This definition intentionally
avoids the language of God’s “inability” to suffer or his “inability” to be acted upon by
creatures. As will be explored later, this definition neither entails a statuesque immobility
within God’s being nor an inability to act upon creation. Additionally, it does not deny
something analogous to an emotional state in God. Indeed, impassibility here affirms that
within God’s being there is a state of unsurpassable bliss, a transcendent joy and perfect
peace that can only belong to the source of all being, truth, goodness, and beauty. God is
eternally pleased in himself through the relation between the triune persons and eternally
delights in the goodness of his own creation, a goodness to which he directs all things. It
does, however, serve as an assurance that when we discuss God, we are speaking of one

Richard Creel identifies eight distinct usages of the term “impassibility” in Christian and nonChristian thought and notes his list might not be exhaustive. See Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in
Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3-9.
1

2
Daniel Castelo’s chapter in a recent “four views” book on impassibility sets out to defend a “qualified
impassibility,” but the doctrine as he describes it entails God willingly entering into give-and-take
relationships with humans. See Castelo, “Qualified Impassibility,” in Divine Impassibility: Four Views of
God's Emotions and Suffering, ed. Robert J. Matz and A. Chadwick Thornhill (Downers Grove: IVP,
2019), 53-74.
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who is decidedly not us.3 Divine impassibility serves to secure God’s good purposes as
creator: no force can act upon God in a way that misdirects him from achieving his good
ends for creation.4 God’s nature is untouched by evil, and as such is untouched by the
sufferings of creation.

Who (or What) is God?
A defense of impassibility must include an understanding of who God is.
Returning to the discussion from the introduction regarding classical theism and theistic
personalism, classical theism holds God to be ontological ground for all that exists.
Rather than the largest and most powerful being among the many created beings, God is
being itself. This is expressed well by Robert Sokolowski in his summary of Anselm of
Canterbury:
(God plus the world) is not greater than God alone; or:
(God plus any creature) is not greater than God alone.5
God is entirely self-sufficient and would be as deserving of glory if there were nothing at
all in existence, or if there were only angels, or if there were angels and animals but no
humans. Far from denigrating God’s relation to creation, this is a revelation of God’s love
for it. On this account, creation is entirely gratuitous, done without compulsion out of
God’s love. As Sokolowski asserts, it does not imply a lack of care but an overflow of
love, something done entirely for its own sake and not as a means to some end (such as

3
D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2009), 181.
4

David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2005), 72.
5

Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 8.
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God’s personal fulfillment), an outpouring of love that culminates in his entering that
creation through the incarnation.6
God must, of course, be understood through his revelation in Scripture and the
Incarnation: God is the God revealed in Jesus. However, God’s otherness from humanity
forces us to temper efforts to assume the incarnation entails God as merely the ultimate
person. Perfect, omnipotent, and omniscient, but still interacting with the world in a
strikingly similar manner to creatures: feeling sad or angry at the failures or betrayals of
his people and being (for some) surprised at the faith or lack thereof displayed by
creatures. Such concepts have biblical warrant,7 but have been typically understood as
anthropomorphic, necessarily read in light of texts like Numbers 23:19, 1 Samuel 15:29,
1 John 1:5, and James 1:17 that tend to point to the classical conception of God.

Impassibility and the Doctrine of God
In order to establish a coherent understaning of divine impassibility, is important
to connect impassibility to the larger doctrine of God. The doctrine is frequently treated
by its detractors (and occasionally, supporters) as a standalone proposition regarding
God’s ability or inability to suffer. When examined this way, it can easily be construed as
a wicked declaration of God’s indifference towards the plight of humanity. This
perspective is misguided but understandable if impassibility is not elucidated in
connection to other aspects of the divine nature. A proper defense of impassibility
recognizes that, while divine suffering is necessary under the framework of theistic

9.
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Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, 9.

7

See, e.g., Genesis 6:6, Exodus 32:10-14; Deuteronomy 9:8; Jeremiah 18:8, 26:19, 32:29; Amos 7:3,
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personalism with its similarities between the experience of God and creatures, classical
theism rejects this notion because of the vast difference between the ways finite creatures
experience the world and the way God does, as the infinite source of all and being itself.
For instance, impassibility can be viewed as a natural corollary of the divine
attributes. God’s simple nature, as the one who is existence itself, a single motion of pure
act, demands an imperviousness to any external force acting upon God in order to
misdirect God from his intended ends. His immutability demands an immutable
emotional state as well. If God is unchanging, his emotional state must be one that cannot
be disturbed by creaturely foibles. If God is timeless, existing in the one “eternal now”
with all of history simultaneous to him, passibility would entail God constantly being
buffeted by not only the highs and lows of what humans consider the “present” but of all
history.
One of the most significant fundamental concerns of the classical doctrine of God
is the notion of God’s simultaneous transcendence and immanence. God is, as Augustine
says, interior intimo meo et superior summo meo (“more inward than my most inward
part and higher than the highest element within me”).8 God is not a discrete object in the
universe, occupying the same ontological space as creation, but as the source of all being
transcends a division between existence and nonexistence. God’s being is not simply
necessary because he is everlasting or invulnerable to nonexistence, but it is purely actual

8

Augustine, Confessions 3.6.11. Translation in Augustine, Confessions: A New Translation, trans.
Henry Chadwick, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 43.
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and infinite, “the ‘is’ both of the ‘it is’ and ‘it is not.’”9 God is not transcendent by
“negation of the opposite” but by surpassing any dialectic between such negations.10
An important aspect of the discussion around divine transcendence is the
distinction made by Kathryn Tanner between “contrastive” and “noncontrastive
transcendence,”11 which others have referred to as “noncompetitive transcendence.”12 She
begins by noting the problems philosophers (particularly Post-Socratics) found with the
prior Greek philosophy as well as Greek and Roman religion: there is a univocity of
being present between divinity and humanity. Divinity is a sort of being different from
others but “within the matrix of the same cosmos.”13 The divine shares characteristics
with the human/created realm, with the characteristics merely enhanced in the divine
realm.14 Greek philosophy, on the other hand, set divinity in opposition to the natural
world. This was done because the univocity between humanity and divinity made it
difficult to posit the divine as the source of all—the divine merely worked with the
already-present created world.15 However, this created a problem: as particular
philosophers work to make God (or divinity) transcendent, they subsequently make him
less and less involved in the world. This is because a primarily “contrastive” definition of
David Bentley Hart, “Impassibility as Transcendence: On the Infinite Innocence of God,” in The
Hidden and the Manifest: Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 168.
9

10

Ibid., 169.
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Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 37-48.
Robert Barron, “The Metaphysics of Coinherence: A Meditation on the Essence of the Christian
Message,” in Exploring Catholic Theology: Essays on God, Liturgy, and Evangelization (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 2015), 34.
12

13

Tanner, God and Creation, 39.
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Ibid., 39-40.

15

Ibid., 40.
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transcendence was used by Hellenistic philosophers: divinity was defined in opposition to
the physical realm. So, whereas the physical world is defined by “becoming, uncertainty,
and instability,” the divine world is “a realm of eternal, changeless intelligibility.”16 This
extreme separation made interaction between the two realms nearly impossible and led to
a circumstance in which the work of the divine was done through intermediaries—or, in
some circumstances, the divine created only the greatest intermediary being and was no
longer involved in the world at all.17
Plotinus approximates the “non-contrastive” approach best among Greek
philosophers by combining univocal and contrastive speech about God in order to express
transcendence and divine involvement, but such an ad hoc approach is untenable.18
Christian theology offers a solution to the Greek dilemma through the proposition of noncontrastive account of divine transcendence. God’s engagement in the world only varies
inversely with his transcendence when God and the world are considered in contrast. The
Christian solution to the dilemma came through the non-contrastive usage of terms that,
under a Greek schema, were contrastive terms. Such terms include ingenerate,
immutable, simple, and most significant for this study, impassible.19 The Christian
understanding of divine transcendence moves beyond the duality of contrast and

16

Tanner, God and Creation, 40.

17

Ibid., 43-45.

18

Ibid., 42.

19

Ibid., 56.
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univocity by recognizing that God transcends “all oppositional contrasts” of relations
between creatures, “including that of presence and absence.”20
God is thus utterly distinct from the world as its transcendent source, but not in
the contrastive manner expressed by the Greek philosophers of old. The Christian
understands God as radically distinct from the world, as “otherly other;”21 she recognizes
that “God differs differently;”22 that “God is not so much somewhere else as somehow
else.”23 God is not a being but being itself, and so “does not destroy the natural necessities
of things he becomes involved with, even in the intimate union of the incarnation.”24 As
Sokolowski says:
The reason the pagans could not conceive of anything like the incarnation is that
their gods are part of the world, and the union of any two natures in the world is
bound to be, in some way, unnatural, because of the otherness that lets one thing
be itself only by not being the other. But the Christian God is not a part of the
world and is not a “kind” of being at all. Therefore the incarnation is not
meaningless or impossible or destructive.25
The noncompetitive transcendence of God is feasible only if God is the “fecund provider
of all that the creature is in itself,”26—if all the goodness which exists in the creature is a
gift of God. The creature’s goodness does not compete with God because God operates
on a separate level, so to speak, from humanity. Because of this, statements like “in him
20

Tanner, God and Creaton, 56-57.

21
Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2001), 12.

Henk Schoot, Christ the ‘Name’ of God: Thomas Aquinas on Naming Christ (Leuven: Peeters,
1993), 144.
22

Robert Barron, “To See According to the Icon of Jesus Christ: Reflections on the Catholic
Intellectual Tradition,” in Exploring Catholic Theology, 66.
23

24

Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, 35-36.

25

Ibid., 36.

26

Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, 3.
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we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28) and “all that we have done, you have
done for us” (Isa. 26:12b) reveal something of God’s activity in the world. God’s acts do
not compete with human acts, so his agency is not mutually exclusive with human
agency.27
A contrastive model of transcendence in the Christian context often strays into
theistic personalism: God and creatures “compete” for space. Since the classical Christian
understanding of transcendence is no longer emphasized by theistic personalists, the
demand for divine involvement in creation that is a corollary to the Christian confession
necessitates a univocal understanding of being between divinity and humanity. As such,
the doctrine of creation for many theistic personalists includes God moving aside or
“contracting” to make room for creatures who are not God.28 As Thomas Weinandy
argues, the patristic writers utilized impassibility in their theology precisely to offer an
account of the biblical notion of divine “otherness.”29 David Bentley Hart identifies the
patristic understanding of impassibility as the “great discovery” of the Christian tradition
as it reveals the “true nature” of God’s transcendence.30 Impassibility also serves to
protect God’s involvement in the world—if impassibility is a way of expressing God’s
imperturbable inner peace, it explains how God can be so intimately involved with
creation without losing the peace and joy central to his nature. Even as he acts to heal, to

27

This does not implicate God in evil. The assertion here is that God can accomplish his good ends
through the work of humans, and it is not wrong to assert that God has worked in the actions of his people.
However, it does not follow that God is not implicated in every human act, as the evil is an example of
creaturely rejection of and turning away from God.
28

See comments on Moltmann’s doctrine of creation in chapter 2 below.

29

Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 199.

30

Hart, “Impassibility as Transcendence,” 169.
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cleanse, to empower his creatures, God is spared from corruption by the evils in the
world. Because God transcends all human suffering and cannot be adversely affected by
an encounter with it, he is most able to overcome it. Far from making God aloof and
uninvolved, as its critics claim, impassibility allows God to be more radically involved
than any suffering person could be.31 His impassibility prevents “any force, pathos, or
potentiality interrupting the perfection of his nature or hindering him in the realization of
his own illimitable goodness, in himself and in his creatures.”32

The Analogy of Being and Impassibility
The question of language about God is a broad one that cannot be fully explored
in this project. However, it is important to understand the place of the analogia entis
(analogy of being) in this discussion. Despite the ontological difference between
humanity and God, there are things that can be truthfully said of God. Although it is
impossible for humans to fully know the nature of God, certain things can nevertheless be
predicated of him: love, goodness, truth, mercy, justice, holiness. However, because God
is infinite and simple, he does not exist as a being like humans simply magnified to a
greater degree of power and perfection. God’s transcendence places him on a separate
ontological plane from humanity. Thus, the language used to speak of God must be
analogical. Language of God’s goodness, for instance, cannot be univocal with humanity
as the goodness that exists in people is tempered by sin, and cannot measure up to the
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fullness of the good. It cannot be equivocal, because there is an obvious sense in which
the goodness of humans corresponds to and is dependent upon the goodness of the
creator. As such, there is an analogical correspondence between these attributes of
humanity and God. These attributes must be understood both as essential and proper to
God. God does not possess goodness to a greater degree than humans, or even to the
greatest possible extent. God simply is goodness itself. It is the same with love, truth,
justice, and God’s other attributes. There is, as Hart says, “an infinite interval” between
God and creation, not because God is ontologically distant but because God is “infinitely
more” than creation. Therefore, theology utilizes analogy to attempt to bridge that
interval of which “God himself is the distance.”33 This is, it should be noted, not a mere
metaphysical exercise but an outworking of the logic implicit in the Christian claim that
God is the creator ex nihilo and therefore the source of all being.34
The above discussion reflects the determination of the Fourth Lateran Council
(1215) which has been influential on the development of the analogia entis—particularly
in the work of the Jesuit theologian Erich Przywara (1889-1972)—that for any similarity
between creator and creature, there must be recognized an “even greater dissimilarity”
(maior dissimilitudo).35 It recognizes that the creature is completely groundless, receiving
its “essential groundedness” from God alone, the source of all being.36 Since God is the
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source of being, humans—and all of creation—are entirely dependent on God, not only
for imparting being, but for continually holding them in existence. Being is not a category
of which God and creation are two instantiations. Instead, God is to be identified with
being, so that any univocal understanding of being cannot be applied to both humans and
God.37 The creature possesses being and so participates in God’s being, not (returning to
the above discussion of transcendence) in opposition to God but subsumed under him as
possessing the being which is God. Even being, the most basic of predications, must be
understood analogically between God and humans because humans exist as finite
instances of being while God is the totality of being itself.38
The loss of the analogia entis has been quite problematic for theology in the last
few centuries. As a result, theology vacillates between the alternatives of God as “pure
identity” and “pure dialectic.”39 God becomes either one who looks entirely humanlike
(theistic personalism) or becomes the “Wholly Other,” entirely unknowable and
impossible to describe in human terms.40 The first option represents a univocal approach
to being while the latter takes an equivocal approach. D. Stephen Long traces this
dichotomy to the problem of language and history—that is, the recognition by
theologians (due in large part to the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach) that language about
God must be placed in a historical context. Since there exists no impartial, universal
position from which to engage in theological talk, all God-talk must be understood in its
historical context. This argument, as Long notes, does not follow, since it begins by
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attacking universalizing statements and concludes with a universalizing assertion, but its
influence remains widespread in theology.41 Such an approach to theological terms—like
impassibility—leads theologians to dismiss such notions as Hellenistic corruptions.42 The
analogical approach mediates between these positions, recognizing that God, as the
source of all that exists, must both allow for some analogue with creation and be distinct
from it due to the nature of his creative transcendence.
For discussions of impassibility, analogy is an important tool to recognize that
God, as the source of all and the transcendent creator, does not interact with the world in
the same way as humans. God’s actions, coming from timeless eternity and being
experienced in the present, may appear to humans as God’s reactions, as him being
moved from favor to anger or vice versa, but these can only be applied to God
analogically.43 Anselm offers a prayer in his Proslogion pondering the strangeness of this
notion:
But how are You at once both merciful and impassible? For if You are impassible
You do not have any compassion; and if You have no compassion Your heart is
not sorrowful from compassion with the sorrowful, which is what being merciful
is. But if You are not merciful whence comes so much consolation for the
sorrowful?
How, then, are You merciful and not merciful, O Lord, unless it be that
You are merciful in relation to us and not in relation to Yourself? In fact, You are
[merciful] according to our way of looking at things and not according to Your
way. For when You look upon us in our misery it is we who feel the effect of
Your mercy, but You do not experience the feeling. Therefore You are both
merciful because you save the sorrowful and pardon sinners against You; and You
are not merciful because You do not experience any feeling of compassion for
misery.44
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This passage has been taken by many opponents of impassibility as expressing the
impossibility of God being both impassible and merciful. Anselm believes both, but
according to such opponents he is merely clinging blindly to the Greek metaphysics he
has inherited while unwittingly exposing a fatal flaw.45 However, while Anselm is
expressing a difficulty for human perception, he is not delivering a fatal blow to
impassibility. For one, this is not a denial of something analogous to an emotional state in
God. As Katherin Rogers argues, God cannot be “infect[ed]” by human sufferings nor
moved to greater joy because God possesses an imperturbable and infinite joy within his
being, and it cannot be disturbed by anything outside of God even as he acts in the world
to heal, forgive, and save.46

God’s Goodness and Evil
The full implications of God’s relation to evil will be explored further in the
discussion of impassibility and theodicy.47 However, it is important here to discuss the
nature of evil in relation to God. As discussed above, the source and definition of
goodness, truth, and beauty is the good God who created all things by his might and
wisdom. Since God is perfect and the creator of all that is, creation and existence are
good, as the creation account repeatedly affirms (Gen 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31). If all
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that is created is good and God is goodness and being itself, the source of everything that
is, God cannot be the author of evil.
This has been resolved in the Christian tradition, most notably in Augustine, by
understanding evil as privatio boni, the privation of the good.48 Evil, then, is not a “thing”
in the way good is. Good is a substance, the very substance of God. Evil is a privation of
the good. It has no ontological substance—to declare otherwise would be to make God
the author of evil. Evil is a product of the will, a turning back of the created being
towards the nothingness from which it was created and away from the source of goodness
that called it forth.49 It is a movement from the goodness and light of the creator towards
the ever-present darkness of nonbeing. As Hart puts it, evil is “a kind of ontological
wasting disease”50 that corrupts the telos of the will (and the world) from its natural
inclination towards the good. Augustine notes this in his discussion of the sexual
escapades of his youth. He attributes his promiscuity before becoming a Christian to a
good desire—namely, the desire to love and be loved. However, his mind was befuddled
by “carnal concupiscence” so that he could not differentiate between “love’s serenity”
and “lust’s darkness,” and was led into sin.51 This entails, it should be noted, that God can
still know evil. Since God fully knows what it is to be good, he can also understand evil
as a privation of that good.52
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Impassibility and the Incarnation
All discussion of impassibility is for naught if it cannot be accounted for in the
incarnation, life, and passion of Jesus. The work of Athanasius and Cyril, both bishops of
Alexandria, will be helpful in this regard. An important consideration for this
conversation concerns the full divinity of Jesus. If he is “light from light, true God from
true God,”53 he cannot be lacking in any aspect of divinity when he becomes incarnate. If
it were possible to ascribe an attribute to God but not Jesus, then God in his fullness did
not become human. It may be possible to say that something divine became human, but
not that God became human. This understanding is exemplified by contemporary
kenoticists who claim Philippians 2 demands the Logos lose some aspects of divinity in
the “self-emptying” act of becoming human.54 While it may be a compelling explanation
of the full humanity of Jesus, it leaves open the question of his full divinity. If Jesus
abandons some aspects of what it is to be God in the incarnation, how can he be fully
God? Further, if one person of the Trinity can abandon some aspects of God, this seems
to suggest that, at least for a time, the divine Word’s nature differed from that of the
Father and Spirit.
This argument is hardly new in the Christian tradition. The Arians employed
similar arguments, and the tradition has had an answer since (at least) the time of
Athanasius. The divine nature did not change to become flesh; it assumed humanity into
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God.55 The incarnation was an assumption of humanity taken on by the Logos rather than
a metaphysical change by the Logos into humanity. The Word, whose “generation was
impassible, everlasting, and appropriate to God,” lost nothing of his nature when he came
to earth.56 Following this tradition Augustine notes regarding the language of Christ’s
self-emptying, “what then does it mean, ‘he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave’?
It means he is said to have emptied himself out by accepting the inferior, not by
degenerating from equality.”57 The emptying is one of taking on the inferior human
nature, not of losing any aspect of the divine nature.
The interpretation of Philippians 2:5-11 was a significant issue in the fourth
century debate between Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius. The key issue for them is the
referent of Paul’s statement “he emptied himself.” For Nestorius, the one who is emptied
is the “passible man indwelt by the Word.”58 For the Word to be “emptied” would lead
naturally to the Word being passible, as he would somehow take part in the man’s
suffering, which would preclude him from being true God. Cyril, on the other hand, held
the kenotic act as necessarily referring to the Word. The Word “took flesh of the holy
Virgin…underwent our human birth and came forth as a man from woman without
abandoning what he was but remaining…God, that is, in nature and truth.”59 Of course,
following earlier Christians (including Athanasius), this did not entail a change in the
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divine Word. He remains “unchangeable and immutable… even when a baby… he still
filled the whole creation as God and was co-regent with his sire.”60
When the Word took on flesh, impassibility was an integral part of its
composition. The redemption of humanity by the Logos who becomes incarnate is an
important theme for Athanasius. Christ comes to redeem our human nature and unite it to
the divine, and as such moves us from corruptible and mortal to incorruptible and
undying. He says, “For no longer according to… Adam do we die; but henceforward our
origin and all infirmity of flesh being transferred to the Word, we rise from the earth, the
curse from sin being removed, because of Him… [who became] a curse for us.”61 He goes
on to cite 1 Peter 4:1 (“Since therefore Christ suffered in the flesh”) and explain how
Christ can change, suffer, and live a fully human life. Christ’s birth, afflictions, limited
knowledge, and other creaturely occurrences are proper to his human nature, but not to
his divine. The sufferings and changes can be said to happen to the Word because they
are “proper to the flesh” and a body “is proper to the Savior.”62 Athanasius can even go so
far as to claim that the Word undergoes death.63 He notes that Christ remained in the
grave three days to prove his death was a true one.64 And the Word, while remaining
impassible in his nature, is not harmed or diminished by sufferings, but takes them up
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into himself and thus “obliterat[es] and destroy[s] them,” offering humanity a chance to
to gain impassibility and thus be eternally free from suffering and death.65
The weeping, exhaustion, and suffering of Christ show the human nature of Jesus
but do not denigrate the divine. If he did not display the passible nature of a human, it
would be possible to speculate he was not fully human, and if he is not fully human, he
cannot be the one who redeems human flesh. The Impassible One took on a passible
nature but was not overcome by it; instead he redeemed it. Athanasius says, “what the
human Body of the Word suffered, this the Word, dwelling in the body, ascribed to
Himself, in order that we might be enabled to be partakers of the Godhead of the Word.”66
The Arians, Athanasius says, point to these instances of passibility to argue against the
divinity of the Son, but ignore such statements as “the Father and I are one” (Jn. 10:30).
Thus, the position that makes the most sense of what Jesus claimed about himself and the
accounts of him in the Gospels is the orthodox position of Athanasius.67
The communcatio idiomatum has come to refer to the way aspects of the human
and divine natures of Christ can be attributed to the single person of Christ and thus to
God. Oliver Crisp offers a succinct definition:
The attribution of the properties of each of the natures of Christ to the person of
Christ, such that the theanthropic person of Christ is treated as having divine and
human attributes at one and the same time, yet without predicating attributes of
one nature that properly belong to the other nature in the hypostatic union,
without transference of properties between the natures and without confusing or
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commingling the two natures of Christ or the generation of a tertium quid [third
sort of thing].68
Though he sometimes speaks of the Word undertaking the passion as an example
for humans of how to live and serve,69 Cyril clearly believes suffering can be in some way
predicated of the Word through communication with the human nature of Christ. His
view is similar to that of Athanasius: he holds strongly to the impassibility of the Word in
its nature but believes that the Word takes on suffering in an impassible way in the
crucifixion. The Word “makes the passible body his very own” and because of this, can
be said to suffer “by means of something naturally passible,” and as such is worthy of
being called “Savior of all.”70 The Word suffers in the manner which it is proper (his
human nature) and is impassible in the manner in which it is proper (in his divinity).
Suffering can still be predicated of the Word because of his intimate uniting with the
human nature but cannot be ascribed to the divine nature.71 Though he acknowledges its
imperfection, Cyril offers an analogy of fire heating iron; the iron takes the heat into
itself, and if it is struck, the material is altered. However, the nature of the fire remains
unchanged. So it is with the divine Word: it is taken into the human nature, and when the
human nature is beaten and suffers, the impassible Word remains unchanged.72
Athanasius and Cyril maintain throughout their works that the Word did not suffer
in the incarnation. This is important for the contemporary debate around divine suffering
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and especially the categories that are often placed on these early church writers, such as
“biblicists,” “philosophers,” “theopaschites,” and “impassibilists.”73 These categories are
often applied to authors but are truly misnomers. Nestorian attempts to hold absolute
impassibility were driven by the exegetical concern to maintain a real division between
Creator and creature, while Cyril’s explanation of the Word’s impassible suffering is an
attempt to give a Christian account of divine involvement.74 Hart’s perspective is helpful
for relating these concepts to the contemporary milieu. He points to Cyril’s affirmation of
the impassible God as present “in the crucified body claiming the sufferings of his flesh
as his own impassibly.”75 Statements like this, Hart argues, should be understood not as
paradoxes but as simple formulas that explain the scriptural narration of Christ’s gift of
salvation. It holds that God in his nature did not change at all in the incarnation. If such a
change were to occur within God in the incarnation, God did not become human. It could
not be said that the fullness of deity dwelt bodily within Christ if he did not possess the
fullness of God’s nature. Cyril repeatedly affirms that God did not lose or alter his nature
in the incarnation. Instead, the human nature was added to the divine nature so that God
could appropriate the “weakness and poverty” of the human nature in the salvation of
humanity.76
Though the exact mechanics of the hypostatic union between human and divine
natures cannot be known, it is not an incoherent notion. Since God is not an object in the
universe or a being among other beings, he is not transformed into a human at the
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incarnation. Instead, as “the being of everything,” God is made known to the world in the
one human who most displays what it is to be human—to bear the image of God.77 The
appearance of God in the flesh is merely the manifestation of the infinite divine image in
the form of the finite divine image.78 As Benjamin Myers notes, in classical Christology
the two natures of Christ retain a distinctiveness from one another while still participating
in the other’s properties. Without compromising humanity, Christ is “filled with divine
life,” and without compromising divinity and impassibility, Christ is “able to enter the
privation of death.”79 Because of this, it can be truly said that God suffers and dies
without the divine nature being changed by it. Death is a phenomenon of the finite, and as
such cannot harm the infinite God—as Gregory of Nyssa notes, it is easier for the divine
nature to touch death without experiencing harm than it is for a human to touch water
without harm.80 Because of this, God assumes the human nature in the incarnation,
uniting the infinite divine nature with the human.81
There remains a question of compatibility between attributing impassibility and
passibility to the person of Christ. This apparent contradiction has been noted by several
critics of impassibility who claim it is impossible for a being to be simultaneously
passible and impassible.82 Timothy Pawl offers a rejoinder to such claims: whereas it is
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incoherent to attribute impassibility defined as a thing being incapable of suffering
“under any circumstances” to the person of Christ,83 there is an alternative way of
understanding impassibility in the incarnation that does not suffer this incompatibility. If
impassibility is understood as “having a nature that is not causally affectable,” and
passibility as “having a nature that is causally affectable,” the problem is solved.84 The
conciliar attribution of two natures in one person makes the predication of impassibility
and passibility to the same person coherent.

Conclusion
Impassibility has been a significant aspect of theological reflection since the days
of the early church. It has held an important place in both the doctrine of God and the
debates around Christology, and its import can be felt on many other areas of theology,
such as divine transcendence. Though it has been widely maligned in recent centuries, a
proper understanding of the term reveals many such criticisms to be unfair caricatures of
a crucial doctrine. The remaining chapters of this work will turn to such criticisms in
more detail and offer an answer to them utilizing the foundational insights of this chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Theodicy Question

One major concern for those who insist upon suffering as essential to God’s
nature is the question of theodicy. A scene from Elie Wiesel’s Night, a memoir of his
experience as a Jew in the Holocaust, serves as a reference point for many such
passibilists. Wiesel describes the execution of a child in Auschwitz, hung until death by
Nazi captors:
“Where is God? Where is He?” someone behind me asked…
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and
death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the
face. He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his
eyes not yet glazed.
“Where is God now?” And I heard a voice within me answer him: “Where
is he? Here he is—He is hanging here on this gallows…”1

Jürgen Moltmann’s Theodicy
In commenting on the above passage, Jürgen Moltmann declares that “any other
answer [than Wiesel’s] would be blasphemy.”2 In the face of the evils of the world:
murder, abuse, theft, exploitation, neglect, sexual assault, torture, and hate, the only
answer that can be offered to those who are suffering is that God too suffers their pain.
They are not left alone in the world, no matter how deeply they feel their sorrow, because
God feels it. God anguishes over their pain, deep within his very being. Under this course
of thought, the cross of Jesus is the suffering God’s message to humanity, a definitive
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declaration of God’s intimate love for those he created. Jesus identifies himself with the
godforsaken on the cross, to the point of being “cut off” from the Father and descending to
the depths of God-forsakenness, suffering death and loss.3 Through this suffering, God
enters into the darkness of humanity to offer rescue to those long crushed under the weight
of the evil in the world.
Before arriving at the cross, however, Moltmann’s theodicy begins with creation.
The cross is the central point of this creation, but there is a reason for the evil in the world
that can be understood as a corollary of the nature of God’s creative act. The Father loves
the Son so much that his “self-communicating love” for the Son allows him to be opened
to “the Other” and so “becomes creative,” by means of the Holy Spirit.4 The world is
created by an outpouring of love by the triune God: rather than working to create the
greatest possible world, God contracts into himself and fashions the world from
nothingness. For Moltmann, “nothing” functions in a strange way: “nothing,” is, in fact
something. It is the space created when God withdraws himself to make room for
something not-God, and it is this space God begins to fashion into creation.5 God
“[lowers] himself into his own impotence” by allowing himself to be withdrawn from the
space where creation is made.6 He opens himself up to the possibility of that which is notGod to reject its creator. This is a requirement for mutual love: the beloved must be able to
reject the love offered by the lover. Creation is “open” and can possibly become better or
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worse through the course of decisions made by free creatures.7 Evil can exist because the
space which is not-God allows for decisions to be made in contradiction to God’s will.
God loves and cares for the creation, but it has the freedom required by love to reject his
love and the duty to reciprocate that love.
After creation comes the event of the cross, the central event in the history of God.
Moltmann understands the abandonment felt by Jesus as an experience that occurs within
God. As the Word of God in flesh, Jesus is a member of the Godhead and therefore his
feeling of abandonment at the hands of his Father is horrifically painful and frightening.
Because of the nature of this occurrence, not only does Jesus suffer in the crucifixion, but
the Father does as well. The suffering of God the Father of Jesus is qualitatively different
from the suffering of the Son but is a terrible suffering all the same. The Son suffers the
loss of the Father, and the Father suffers the loss of the Son, an integral part of the being
of God. Not only does the Father suffer the loss of the Son with whom he has shared
eternal communion, but the Father loses a sense of identity. When the Father whose Son
was eternally begotten suffers the death of that Son, the Father’s sense of identity is
thrown into crisis.8 God takes the judgement for sin humanity rightly deserves on himself,
suffering the fate humanity deserved.9 At the cross, the nothingness of creation is
subsumed into the person of God. In Jesus’ death, God “revealed himself and constituted
himself in nothingness.”10 God not only withdraws at creation to allow for “the Other” to
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be called forth from nothing, but he also enters into that nothingness, bringing it into the
triune life and incorporating it into his eschatological victory.11
Crucial to Moltmann’s understanding of the suffering of Christ on the cross is the
cry of dereliction recorded in Mark 15:34: “At three o’clock Jesus cried out with a loud
voice, “Eloi, Eloi, lema sabachthani?” which means, “My God, my God, why have you
forsaken me?”12 This cry, for Moltmann, signifies an event of “God against God” as the
Father abandons Jesus to his fate. Trusting the efforts of the historical-critical method,
Moltmann posits this saying as an authentic rendering of the crucifixion. He assumes
Markan priority, speculates embarrassment among the early Christians by the idea of
Jesus being given up by God, and posits that later gospel traditions tempered the words of
Jesus on the cross. Therefore, he assumes Mark’s account to be the earliest and most
accurate tradition of Jesus’ words from the cross. The assumption that Mark captures the
authentic words of Jesus leads Moltmann to conclude that Jesus truly experiences Godforsakenness on the cross, a true loss of Christ from the Godhead.13 The resurrection is
then a reuniting of the Son to God as God overturns the condemnation placed on Jesus by
his accusers and vindicates his life and teachings.14 Although Jesus is quoting the opening
line of Psalm 22, a lament that ends in a resounding word of praise for God and trust in
his coming salvation, Moltmann rejects the notion that these words are a sign to the

11

Moltmann, The Crucified God, 218.

12

All Scripture quoted is from the New Revised Standard Version.

13

Moltmann, The Crucified God, 146-147. As Bruce Marshall notes, this confidence in the ability of
the historical-critical method to offer support for “theologically basic results” is not considered nearly as
well-founded today as it was when Moltmann initially wrote The Crucified God. Marshall, “The
Dereliction of Christ and the Impassibility of God,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human
Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 248n1.
14

Ibid., 166-168.

36
people that Jesus is invoking the psalm to express hope in God. He argues that the
invocation of the psalm cannot point to hope because there is a deliverance from death
recalled at the end of the psalm, but no such deliverance occurs at Golgotha. The cross
represents the greatest example of divine suffering and it is the place where God is
constituted as God. In his suffering and the enmity incurred between the divine persons,
he is fully revealed as the God who suffers. He comes in the most unexpected way—
rejected, god-forsaken, condemned to die as a criminal—and his greatness is revealed in
his rejection, the kenotic act of allowing himself to be killed on the cross.15
The crucifixion is, for Moltmann, the answer to the “protest atheism” offered by
Voltaire and Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s fictional Ivan Karamazov. Protest atheism insists the
existence of a good God cannot be reconciled with the evil in the world. For Moltmann,
“the only way past protest atheism” is to insist upon the God as the one who suffers on
the cross.16 The interplay of the Father and the Son sharing in suffering in their own
unique ways shows that “God and suffering are no longer contradictions… but God’s
being is in suffering and the suffering is in God’s being itself, because God is love.”17
This is best shown by the cry of dereliction from the cross. This is where God is revealed,
with the cry from the cross revealing God as himself god-forsaken, the deepest possible
identification with the sufferer who above all suffers a loss of God.18
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Because the Son is not spared but is “given up,” the godless can find themselves
reconciled to God.19 The trinitarian being of God shares in the sufferings of Jesus, taking
on death so humans could face death in the confidence death would not separate them
from God. Even more, the experience of death on the cross makes it possible for Christ to
be the foundation of the new creation in which God will make all things well within
God’s being and in creation. Just as the eschatological working of God in raising Jesus
“blotted out and replaced the historical action of man in his crucifixion,”20 the
eschatological working of God will overcome the evils of the world and bring them under
God’s redeeming power.
For Moltmann, one can only love inasmuch as one suffers. So, if God failed to
suffer when humanity suffered, God would be less than the human who feels the pain of
his fellow.21 If God is our Father, then God must feel the pain of humanity the same way a
good human parent would be agonized over the hurt of her child. If a parent were entirely
unaffected by her child’s suffering a serious injury, it would rightly call into question that
parent’s love for the child. It would be monstrously callous to remain impassive under
such circumstances. As such, an answer to Moltmann’s critique must establish both an
alternative understanding of love that does not necessarily include co-suffering and a
definition of impassibility that does not implicate God as an aloof observer to the pain
and suffering of his creatures. The following sections will examine some flaws in
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Moltmann’s formulation before moving to a constructive proposal for an alternative to
his theodicy.

Problems with Moltmann’s Theodicy
Setting aside the questions of tritheism22 and other concerns with Moltmann’s
schema outside of theodicy, the suffering of God perspective does hold some emotional
appeal. However, it does not seem to truly answer the problem of evil. It might be
pleasant to imagine God feeling pain like humans do at the suffering of a friend or family
member, but it does not explain evil’s existence. What comfort is it that God selfflagellates alongside suffering humanity? Consider a man walking in the woods who
accidentally steps into a bear trap. As he remains in the trap, his leg torn and ruined, his
father comes along. In answer to the trapped son’s cry for help, the father hurries to the
closest bear trap he can find and intentionally steps on that trap. He is then with his son in
his suffering, feeling every bit of the son’s agony. What comfort is there for the son in his
father’s suffering? It would be perverse to demand another feel our suffering to truly love
us. Even if we consider God as suffering in a different way—looking down on our pain
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and feeling something akin to the human experience of sympathetic suffering—what
relief is that knowledge? Perhaps the suffering of God would be more comforting under a
process scheme, where God is impotent to counter evil in the world and can only respond
with the helpless co-suffering of a human whose loved one is suffering. Moltmann,
however, does not take such a route. As will be explored below, the existence of a
suffering God is far from comforting if its full implications are realized.
When it comes to the important “cry of dereliction,” a distinction must be made,
as Bruce Marshall suggests, between the aspects of humanity “God the Son becomes in
order to transform [them], and what he becomes in order to destroy [them].”23 There are
aspects of the post-fall human state that Christ takes on in order to purify them, and those
he takes on to reject and demolish. Following Cyril of Alexandria, Marshall identifies
Christ becoming flesh (Jn. 1:14) as an instance of the former category and Christ
becoming “sin” (2 Cor. 5:21) or “a curse” (Gal. 3:13) for humanity as belonging to the
latter.24 In taking on death, Jesus does not undergo divine abandonment: he undoes it. The
cry of Jesus on the cross is on the behalf of those for whom he has suffered, the ones for
whom he became flesh. The question becomes a rhetorical one—humanity now, through
“their Eucharistic share in his life-giving flesh” belongs to Christ and as such can by no
means suffer God-forsakenness any longer.25
Additionally, the writings of Athanasius on the cry of dereliction can offer a
supplement to the impassibilist understanding of the cry of dereliction. Of course, for
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Athanasius the cry is not an event within God. Beyond this, Athanasius argues, the cry is
not a tale of despair: the cry was answered! The shaking of the earth, rending of the
curtain in the temple, and the return of many people long-dead signify God’s answer to
the cry. God answers the question “Why have you forsaken me?” with an overturning of
the earth. His answer is, “I have not.”
For behold when He says, ‘Why hast Thou forsaken Me?’ the Father shewed that
He was ever and even then in Him; for the earth knowing its Lord who spoke,
straightway trembled, and the veil was rent, and the sun was hidden, and the rocks
were torn asunder, and the graves, as I have said, did gape, and the dead in them
arose; and, what is wonderful, they who were then present and had before denied
Him, then seeing these signs, confessed that ‘truly He was the Son of God.26
Impassibility remains significant as it prevents Jesus from being overcome by the
despair, pain, and fear that are inherent to his human nature but have no place in his
divine nature. Christ came in a body like ours to redeem our bodies, and the divinity at
work within him allowed him to bring humans into divinity. The impassible Word allows
Jesus to be healed from his sufferings by divinity. He suffers on behalf of humanity, but
his impassible nature allows him to keep and assume humans; even those who humiliate,
mock, and injure him.27 His impassible suffering allowed people a chance to gain
impassibility and immortality and be preserved forever incorruptible.28
Further, there is a significant problem with the idea of a God who suffers,
especially if that suffering is considered essential to God’s nature. The flaw in this
schema is ably drawn out by David Bentley Hart in his discussion of Moltmann’s (among
others’) understanding of a suffering God. If God, as Moltmann insists, can only love
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inasmuch as he suffers, evil is a necessary aspect of God’s love. However, if this is the
case, the love with which God creates the world is an imperfect love, as God has not had
occasion to suffer prior to the creation of the world. That is, unless one wishes to posit
evil and suffering as an eternal part of God’s nature (a concept much more disturbing
than the idea of an uncaring and uninvolved God, and an entirely untenable position for a
Christian to hold). To put it differently, the suggestion of evil as an essential part of
God’s plan gives evil an ontological status for which God, as the creator of everything, is
culpable. Beyond this, God would be so dependent upon evil that it would make up an
aspect of his being.29 If God’s love requires suffering to be perfect, suffering and evil
must be an aspect of God’s nature—and must be so forever. Otherwise, the removal of
this ingredient that perfects the divine love would return from perfection to imperfection.
Therefore, in the eschatological coming of God’s new creation, evil is not a privation to
be banished by the permeation of everything with divine goodness but an integral part of
God’s very being.
This problem is not solved by suggesting the interweaving and overcoming of evil
in the eschaton. For a God who is shaped by evil—who requires evil to fulfill or perfect
some aspect of his being—entails evil as an aspect of God’s great “odyssey towards
himself.”30 All evil things, from the death and torture of children to the diseases which
cripple, maim, and kill are part of God’s journey to completeness. Additionally, the
problem is not solved by suggesting that God comes into his fullness through the
incarnation in Jesus. Such an understanding would still necessitate the interwoven
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contingencies that constitute the world and life around Jesus. These are all necessary
aspects of the course Jesus’ life takes, and so become concretized by the absolute coming
into his perfection through that life.31 As such, the evils of the world before and during the
life of Jesus would be necessary, implicating God in great historical evil and tragedy just
to allow him to enter into full perfection. As Hart says, it would be quite dreadful if, “in
our eagerness to find a way of believing in God’s love in the Age of Auschwitz, we
should in fact succeed only in describing a God who is the metaphysical ground of
Auschwitz.”32
The suffering of Jesus on the cross is not an instance of God relinquishing power
to allow the world inside his being to destroy him but rather a great and resounding
divine victory. On the cross, the divine Son can be said to truly suffer, but that suffering
is impassible—not in the sense that it is not truly experienced as a product of the
communicatio idiomatum, but because the suffering and evil do not enter into or leave an
indelible mark on the being of God. God takes on suffering and abolishes it, for in the
infinite wellspring of divine peace, power, and love, suffering and evil are utterly
powerless. On the cross, evil and death and suffering are rejected by God, cast down and
overcome. They are exposed for the meaningless, empty perversions of goodness that
they are. And yet, because of the communicatio idiomatum, much of what Moltmann and
others wish to say about the cross is revealed as true. The sufferings of the human nature
of Jesus cannot be confined to his humanity because experience occurs in one’s person
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rather than in one’s nature.33 Thus, the suffering of the person of Jesus the Christ is the
suffering of God’s Word. As Cyril expresses, on the cross God is “in the crucified body
claiming the sufferings of his flesh as his own impassibly.”34 This point is well made by
Michael Ward, when he points to the flaw in the contemporary advocacy for divine
suffering—if Christ suffers “in his divine nature simpliciter,” the suffering engendered
would not be one of nearness to humanity but an “onotologically unique and remote kind
of suffering.”35 For God to suffer as God would be an experience as alien and inexplicable
for us as the nature of God is unknowable, and would provide no answer to human
suffering. The one who suffers and dies on the cross is a member of the Holy Trinity who
suffers just as humans do, as proclaimed in the canons of the Second Council of
Constantinople.36

An Impassibilist Alternative to Moltmann’s Theodicy
In offering an alternative to Moltmann’s theodicy, a logical answer from one who
holds impassibility is that there is no theodicy, not if theodicy is understood as an attempt
to rationalize evil. It is something of a truism in training ministers and counselors: one
should never try to explain suffering to one who is in the midst of it. However, this is
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typically offered before launching into an explanation of why God could hypothetically
allow the existence of evil. Perhaps God has some greater purpose for evil that humans
cannot understand, or the current reality represents the greatest of all possible worlds.37
Perhaps God allows evil so that he can use it to form his people through suffering—after
all, this suggestion has Scriptural warrant (Rom. 5:3-5; Jas. 1:2-3; 1 Pet. 2:19, 3:8-22).
An important distinction should be made between suffering and evil. The two are
by no means mutually exclusive, but neither are they to be entirely identified with one
another. While evil causes suffering (one can argue the finer points of whether every act
of evil causes suffering or not, but it can be accepted as a general rule), suffering is not
always caused by evil. A person who trains hard for something, particularly physically,
can undergo suffering, but the suffering is not caused by evil. In such a circumstance, this
suffering has at its root a good—the attempt to become healthy and promote life, or to
indulge in leisure. Further, it should be affirmed that God can and does bring goods even
from evil (cf. Ro. 8:28; Gen. 50:20). However, this affirmation is a far cry from
implicating God as intending evil. If God is goodness itself and evil the privation of the
good, evil cannot be implicated as positive aspects of God’s purposes and plans but
instead are accidents and utilized in the work of God as accommodations to the finitude
and sin of humanity. Certainly, evil is allowed by God and can be redeemed by God, but
it is not of God and is contrary to his purposes for his good creation.
Evil is a product of the will, a turning back of the created being towards the
nothingness from which it was created and away from the source of goodness which
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called it forth.38 It is a movement away from “the Father of lights, with whom there is no
variation or shadow due to change,” (Jas. 1:17) towards the ever-present darkness of
nonbeing. The substance of evil is a “[twisting] away” of the will from God, who is the
will’s “highest substance.”39 This applies most obviously to those evils inflicted by
humans on other humans and the world at large, but can also be applied to natural evil.
There is certainly biblical precedence for an understanding of natural evil as a result of
cosmic warring between the powers of this world—not “powers” in the abstract, but the
“powers and principalities” as individually conscious spirits with intentions for good or
evil.
Pagan converts in the early church did not merely leave behind the panoply of
gods to which they were once devoted but underwent a process of vigorous rejection of
these gods as evil. The catechist would renounce their previous gods as false, but not as
nonexistent. They were “demons, malign elemental spirits, occult agencies masquerading
as divinities, exploiting human yearning for God, and working to thwart the designs of
God, in order to bind humanity in slavery to darkness, ignorance, and death.”40 The world
is held captive by the “ruler/god of this world” (Jn. 12:31; 14:30, 2 Cor. 4:4), under the
influence of “the evil one” (1 Jn. 5:19) as well as “dominions” and “powers” (1 Cor. 2:8).
These forces are not only human rulers but also spiritual ones—in the Jewish Apocalyptic
tradition, “archons”—who were celestial governors of nations and who, though
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sometimes worshipped as gods, were only creations of the one God.41 The cosmos is
enslaved to these malign forces, and it is only freed through the victory that comes with
the advent of Christ on earth. His conquest of evil and death through the resurrection
allowed the world to be set free from their influence. This victory was accomplished by
the resurrection, but will be truly consummated at the end of all things when Christ
subjects everything under his feet and hands it over to the Father, after which God will be
“all in all” (1 Cor. 15 25-28).
Such an enchanted view of the cosmos seems out of place for moderns who
predominantly view the universe as mechanistic and devoid of the influence of such
deities.42 However, such a view coheres with the Christian vision of a good God and a
fallen world. This understanding explains the occurrence of so-called “natural evils”
(though they are anything but natural) in God’s good creation. They are not caused by
God but by the corrupted wills of those cosmic forces acting upon creation.
There exists in Christian thought a conception of the will as comprised of two
parts: the natural and the gnomic wills. The natural will is directed towards humanity’s
natural end: that is, towards God. The creation naturally is drawn towards the good which
is its telos. The gnomic will is that deliberative aspect that allows for choice between the
pursuing or abandoning the goodness towards which the natural will is drawn. Maximus
the Confessor, a key figure in the theological understanding of the will, declares the evil
to be “nothing else than this difference of our gnomic will from the divine [natural]
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will.”43 While some might argue that God could not create a will that is independent of
his own, or acts without God as its primary mover,44 such assertions rest on a theological
mistake. The assumption that human wills cannot be created as independent from God’s
will rests upon an insufficient view of divine transcendence—it is as logically cogent to
suggest God can create wills that are not his as it is to suggest God can create beings that
are not God.45 While God’s will is one and simple, like his being, the wills of his
creatures are composite and, though dependent on him for existence, can operate outside
of and against his will. Just as the ultimate goal of contingent beings is participation in
God’s infinite being, the aim of the finite wills is conformity to the infinite will.46
Maximus cites God’s impassibility in his understanding of the will’s being drawn
towards God. Because God is unmoved by suffering or pathos, the will can be drawn
towards him. The purpose of human freedom is finally the relinquishing of that freedom
to God in love.47
Evil, as a product of the corrupted will, must thus be understood as entirely
antithetical to God. Any attempt to “make sense” of evil in the face of God is a misguided
one: evil has no being of its own, no natural place within the order of God’s good
creation. Moltmann’s theodicy fails because ultimately it makes God not only responsible
for suffering, but also makes every act of evil and suffering necessary parts of history.
43
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This (unintended but inevitable) notion must be rejected as fundamentally opposed to the
Christian understanding of a God who is love. The cross is not an expression of God’s
eternal suffering nature; it is the repudiation of everything that has tarnished his good
creation from the beginning. Evil is not a part of God’s plan to be understood, but an
error made by creation that must be overcome and was overcome by the saving life,
death, and resurrection of Christ. Any attempt to reconcile evil with God’s existence
through attributing inexplicable suffering to the divine nature is misguided. It is an
attempt to make sense where none can be found: evil is not a thing to be reconciled with
God’s existence because evil is its antithesis and comes about through the rejection of
God by the misdirection of the will from its natural end.
It is important at this juncture to offer a definition of love in contrast to that of
Moltmann. Modern assumptions about love frequently categorize it as a passion to which
we are roused, and this is especially true in his schema. If his assertion that one can only
love inasmuch as one suffers is false, an alternate understanding of love must be offered.
Further, the alternate definition must be one with some corollary to human love.
Otherwise, the Christian exhortation to love one another would be meaningless. The
command to love would be incoherent if no corollary existed between God’s love and
humanity’s love.
Impassibility (apatheia) was brought into Christianity by the patristic writers not
simply as an aspect of divinity but also as a virtue. It shared the name of a Stoic virtue, but
its Christian understanding was altered radically. While the Stoic apatheia was a mere
idleness of the will, a refusal to allow the storms of life to buffet one’s emotions, the
Christian apatheia was a cultivation of love and charity. This comes from the Christian
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God, who, as the possessor of all goodness, is devoid of anxiety, anger, or suffering. A
Christian who masters this virtue is one who has conquered all passions and as such
becomes love: “a single inexorable motion of utter agape.”48 The one who loves in this
way is free to love all things as a reflection of the divine Word who formed them, without
any passions or worries to distract them. Love is not a reaction, it is “the possibility of
every action, the transcendent act that makes all else actual; it is purely positive, sufficient
in itself, without the need of any galvanism of the negative to be fully active, vital, and
creative.”49 This leads to an understanding of divine love as “infinite openness” between
the members of the godhead, a constant giving of love and joy between the impassible
natures of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.50 The persons, sharing in the beauty and goodness
of the divine nature recognize this beauty and find supreme delight in one another, the
satisfaction of the wholly good recognizing the wholly good.51 As such, God possesses a
perfect inner peace that cannot be disturbed and needs neither evil nor suffering to
complete it; nothing can change it or add to it. God is sufficient within himself and thus
creation is an outpouring of the sheer joy that eternally exists within God.52 Human love is
simply a reflection of this perfect divine love. God’s impassible and transcendent love is
the source in which our own love “lives, moves, and has its being.”53
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The implication of impassibility as an aspect of divine love offers an important
corrective for human love. An imitation of the impassibility of God allows us to rid our
love of the imperfections that come along with human finitude.54 The human condition—
finite, fallen, and embodied—entails love as a feeling. Our movements require
emotiveness because we do not possess ultimacy or immutability: we must undergo the
movement from potency to act, as we lack the pure actuality of God’s being. Because of
these things, we are moved to love rather than existing in the constant and perfect state of
loving ourselves (for God, the perichoresis between the divine persons) and loving others
(for God, created things) with an unchanging love. Because of our finitude and
imperfection, we can be moved to greater or lesser love while God remains constant.
However, because human love is derivative of the divine love, there is yet an analogical
connection between our love and God’s.

Conclusion
Moltmann has hardly been alone in his use of divine passibility as a basis for
theodicy. Many have followed his insistence upon the suffering God as the answer to the
presence of great suffering in the world. However, such an uncritical insistence upon
divine suffering has had unintended but unacceptable consequences. The presence of evil
and suffering as constitutive aspects of the divine being eternalize them in the nature of
God and thus in the life of the world to come. Rather than a world where every tear will
be wiped away, it will be a world built upon the tears of history. For the God here
displayed is one whose identity is established in the marches of history, who becomes
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something new through contact with evil and suffering and therefore makes them
historically essential as part of the divine becoming. Instead, Christians must turn to the
God of impassible love, the one who exists eternally as love, sharing the divine love
between the persons of the Trinity and pouring out that love in the act of creation. This
God is eternally who he is, and evil has no part in his being. This is the God who can be
trusted to overcome evil as he presses into the world, subjugates the wicked powers who
are in rebellion, and becomes “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28).

Chapter Four
The Historical Question

The influential work of Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) suggested a corruption of
early Christian theology by the influence of Greek philosophy. Despite convincing
criticisms to the contrary, many modern theologians have championed this thesis of
dogmatic corruption. Few doctrines have come under as much criticism as a result of this
theory than the doctrine of divine impassibility. Although Harnack’s thesis includes many
other doctrines, including the divinity of Christ and other assumed attributes of God in
ancient Christian thought, none have become the target of theological ire as much as
impassibility. Its rejection has become so widespread among modern theologians that the
passibility of God has been dubbed a “new orthodoxy.”1 The ubiquity of Harnack’s
influence on this doctrine is startling; it is rare that any theologian, no matter his or her
perspective on impassibility, discusses the doctrine without mention of its Hellenistic
influence, even if Harnack is not mentioned specifically. This chapter will examine
Harnack’s contribution and the ways its influence can still be seen in contemporary
discussions of impassibility. It will then seek to defend the use of impassibility by the
early church and answer a contemporary iteration of Harnack’s thesis.
Harnack’s views on the Greek influence on early Christian theology is most
developed in his 7-volume History of Dogma. Succinctly, his thesis is: “Dogma in its
conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel.”2 A
Liberal Protestant heavily influenced by his movement’s Kantian view of reason and
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Jesus,3 Harnack conceived of the theology of the early church as a philosophically
impressive but ultimately doctrinally unfaithful movement away from the simple message
of Jesus. This gospel message proclaimed by Christ, according to Harnack, had to do
entirely with God and nothing at all with Jesus.4 The message of Jesus was a simple one of
the fatherhood of God to humanity and of the “new epoch” God is bringing about through
him: it had no metaphysical element whatsoever.5 Though Harnack identifies Paul as the
primary culprit in removing Judaism from its “mother-soil” and transporting it to “the
broad field of the Greco-Roman empire,” he does not fault Paul for this because the
Gospel was meant for all of humanity, and as such necessarily included the massive world
power that was Rome.6 Additionally, Paul was protected from the Hellenization which
plagued later Christian thought because his preaching of Christ crucified and his doctrine
of justification were irreconcilable with Greek philosophy.7 Harnack acknowledges the
writings of the New Testament are all in some ways touched by the Hellenizing influence
in the ancient world; this is exemplified by the New Testament books written in Greek.
Indeed, he claims the Gospel cannot be fully understood if it is conceived narrowly as
solely rooted in Judaism. However, he maintains Greek thought does not form the
presuppositions of the Gospel or the text of the New Testament.8
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The Hellenization Harnack condemns began in the second century, as the
evangelical enthusiasm of the early church waned in subsequent generations. As is natural,
over time the initial fervor of a group wavers and this led to the church bringing Greek
ideas into the fold as it developed doctrines. The church severed its bonds with Judaism
and was susceptible to whatever sought to take hold of it. The towering influence of Greek
thought led to the Hellenization of the church. Because of this, Harnack boldly asserts “the
influx of Hellenism, of the Greek spirit, and the union of the Gospel with it, form the
greatest fact in the history of the Church in the second century, and when the fact was
once established as a foundation it continued through the following centuries.”9
Harnack conceived of the infiltration of Greek thought in several phases. The first
of these came around the year 130 with Greek philosophy coming “straight into the
centre” of Christianity. Greek philosophy without the baggage of mythology and religious
practices entered Christianity first, but was not alone for long. It was followed in the next
century by Greek “mysteries” and “civilization” that begin to impact Christianity. Finally,
by the fourth century, Harnack claims, Hellenism “as a whole and in every phase of its
development was established in the Church,” including polytheism and Greek myth.10
An important movement towards Hellenization came from the early Christian
apologists adopting Greek Logos metaphysics and relating them to Christ. Unable to pass
by the “treasure” of Greek thought, early apologists adopted Greek philosophy and
culture, especially Platonism, including the Greek notion of an “active central idea” which
was intimately involved in the creation of the world. The apologists came up with the
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formula “the Logos=Jesus Christ,” and altered the Johannine Logos-Christology. John, for
Harnack, used the Logos metaphor as a mere “predicate” rather than “the basis of every
speculative idea about Christ.”11 Unfortunately, the early Christians were not faithful to
this Johannine practice. Harnack does not hold this movement as the equivalization of
Christian thought with Greek philosophy as the first Christians certainly had a different
conception of the Logos than the Greeks.12 However, this identification of an aspect of
Greek philosophy with Christianity established Christianity as a school of philosophy in
direct competition with the schools of Greek philosophy.13
William V. Rowe identifies this form of Hellenization as one of two primary types
in Harnack’s thought. This form, which took place with the early apologists and led down
the road to “Dogmatic Christianity,”14 is the “positive identification.”15 According to
Rowe, Harnack perceives the New Testament conception of the Messiah as the Word of
God as different from the conception of the Messiah as the Logos. While the New
Testament teaching is certainly a doctrine, the identification of Jesus with the Logos is
more than that; it is an identification of the “character of the religious teaching of the
Gospel with the character of Greek philosophy.”16 The “negative form” of Hellenization
came through Christianity’s clashes with Gnosticism. Christians were combating the
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Hellenization which Gnosticism would have brought to the faith, but, ironically, they were
fighting against an influence already present in theology.17 Harnack identifies the
beginning of the Catholic church with the conflict against Gnosticism. The early church
worked to keep “Dualism and the acute phase of Hellenism at bay,” but through creedal
commitments and confessions which resulted from this era, the Church became more like
the Hellenism it opposed.18
This infiltration of Hellenism into the Church caused four important and harmful
changes. 1) The Hellenization of Christianity led to a loss of “freedom and independence”
in religious matters and forced assent to creeds. 2) Hellenism forced Christianity to
become primarily about doctrine, which made it much more complicated than the religion
of simple persons it was at its inception. 3) The church became an independent institution,
and a powerful one at that. 4) The Gospel was no longer proclaimed with as much passion
and as the good news as it once was; fear played a much larger role in the Church.19
Harnack’s thesis has come under significant criticism, but it is beyond the scope of this
project to discuss all of these rebuttals.20
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The brief overview does not include Harnack’s specific discussion of impassibility.
This is because, despite the influence his thesis has held over the doctrine, Harnack does
not mention impassibility in his evaluation of Christian doctrine’s Hellenization. He does
mention it briefly in tracing the development of dogma, but does not offer an evaluation of
the doctrine.21 He does claim that the doctrines of God in early centuries turned
“Christianity [into] a deistical religion for the whole world,”22 and would have
undoubtedly condemned impassibility along with the other church doctrines which find
analogues in Greek philosophy. However, Harnack does not explicitly condemn the
doctrine in his writings.
His ideas have left an indelible mark on subsequent theologians, in no aspect more
than impassibility. T.E. Pollard summarizes this position well, denouncing the patristic
impassibility a “particularly striking illustration of the damage done by the assumption of
alien philosophical positions when they are applied to Christian theology.”23 Many
scholars have concurred with Pollard’s assessment, leading to the modern situation in
which affirmation of God’s suffering is nearly ubiquitous. There are still, however, a
number of voices speaking out strongly against the theory of the Greek corruption of early
Christian theology.
The argument in favor of the “Hellenization thesis,” particularly with regard to
impassibility, has been laid out helpfully by Paul Gavrilyuk:
1. Divine impassibility is an attribute of God in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy.
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2. Divine impassibility was adopted by the early Fathers uncritically from the
philosophers.
3. Divine impassibility does not leave room for any sound account of divine
emotions and divine involvement in history, as attested in the Bible.
4. Divine impassibility is incompatible with the revelation of the suffering God in
Jesus Christ.
5. The latter fact was recognized by a minority group of theologians who
affirmed that God is passible, going against the majority opinion.24
This chapter will respond primarily to the first and second points, while the third and
fourth points are addressed elsewhere in this project. The fifth point will not be addressed
as it proves little without the support of the prior four points. The discussion will begin
with an examination of those who have accepted Harnack’s thesis in some form and their
usage of it in defending divine passibility before moving to a response to their claims.

Proponents of the Hellenization Thesis
Jürgen Moltmann is one significant figure who has invoked the influence of Greek
philosophy against impassibility. Though he cites Harnack on a few points in his Crucified
God, he does not do so to support his attack on impassibility. However, the influence of
Harnack’s thesis is obvious. Moltmann clearly blames Platonic influence for the
encroachment of Greek philosophy on theology for the doctrine of impassibility, calling
for Christianity to permanently abandon the God of Plato for the Father of Jesus. He does
give credit to the early church in a place where Harnack would not, calling the doctrine of
the Trinity an idea which “breaks the spell of the old philosophical concept of God.”25 In
his later work, Moltmann criticizes an aspect of Harnack’s thesis, specifically his claim
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that the Gospel had nothing to do with the Son but only with the Father. For Moltmann,
this is clearly untrue based upon Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom.26 For all this,
Moltmann still denounces impassibility along Harnackian lines, contrasting the Greek
definition of deity with the Christian. With Christ’s passion at the center of the Christian
faith, he argues, how can God be said to not suffer?27
Another voice in support of some aspect of Harnack’s thesis is American Lutheran
theologian Robert Jenson. In the first volume of his Systematic Theology, Jenson offers
several criticisms of the Greek influence on early Christianity. He does criticize Harnack’s
perspective on the early church, accusing him of so emphasizing the impurity of the
Gospel after the first century that he unwittingly leaves himself (following his argument to
its logical conclusion) unable to understand the pure Gospel.28 However, he follows
Harnack’s condemnation of Greek theology, accusing the early church of being too eager
to avoid the “foolishness” of the cross described by Paul (1 Cor. 1:18-29), and in this
eagerness perverting key aspects of the New Testament.29 Jenson carries this over into his
discussion of impassibility, calling the doctrine alluring but “deeply alien” to the Christian
faith, an illegitimate holdover from the early church adoption of Platonism. 30
Contemporary Evangelical theologian Greg Boyd has given his own version of the
Hellenization thesis. Boyd does not target the earliest days of the church as Harnack does,
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but rather focuses his ire on later figures in church history. His primary targets are
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. He calls the line of reasoning which led to conceiving of
God as impassible to be “in keeping with the ancient Greek philosophical tradition,” the
adoption of which by Augustine was “one of the greatest missteps in the history of
western philosophy.”31 Strangely, he places the blame for this move at the feet of
Augustine, ignoring the numerous other figures in the early church who utilized such
terms in their reasoning.32 However, his greatest attention is given to the Aristotelian
conception of God found in the works of Thomas Aquinas.33 He criticizes Thomas for
adopting the Aristotelian conception of “the ground of being,” and calls this an
illegitimate starting point for a doctrine of God. Thomas and the Thomistic tradition are
blamed for “preventing revelation from speaking” and instead coming up with definitions
for God from outside the Christian faith.34 He argues that if Aquinas had begun thinking of
God as love rather than the “ground of being,” he never would have conceived of an
impassible God.35 Further, if the medieval church had looked to the cross for their
understanding of God, they would have viewed God’s love as necessarily suffering love
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rather than “reason alone,” and there would be no problem of “ascribing a love-motivated
change to God” that needed to be overcome.36

The Christian Doctrine of Impassibility
Much of recent scholarship stands against these assertions. Robert Sokolowski
notes the Christological heresies rejected by the early church were a rejection of precisely
what those who accept Harnack’s thesis accuse the early church of. These proposals were
rejected to resist the influence of pagan religion on the Christian faith. The notion that the
early controversies represent “just an importation of Hellenistic thought-patterns into
Christianity” represents a failure “to take seriously the need to distinguish the Christian
faith and its theology from simply natural religion and philosophy.”37 While the main
focus of the early church was on understanding the identity of Jesus, their doctrine of God
and the relationship between God and the world were formed alongside it. In the
understanding of how God related through the world, the church came to an understanding
of a God who was not a part of or dependent on the world but who yet entered the world
to redeem it.38 The rejected heresies only told part of this story. Arianism, for example,
agreed that God was not a part of or dependent on the world but did not hold that God in
his fullness entered the world. The God who is transcendent yet immanent, impervious to
evil and pain, and enters the world in Jesus Christ is not the God of the philosophers or
one from the pagan pantheons but the God of the Christian story.
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An important observation, Gavrilyuk notes, is the diverse accounts of divine
emotion present in ancient Greek philosophy. While the topic is often treated by
passibilists as if it were monolithic in ancient Greek philosophy, this is not supported by
the evidence. Employing the examples of the Epicureans, Middle Platonists, and Stoics,
Gavrilyuk notes there were extreme differences in conception of divine emotion between
these three representative schools. Additionally, Gavrilyuk establishes that although
impassibility did become widely accepted among the later Platonists, impassibility was
only applied to God in a highly technical aspect in the writings of Aristotle and in seedform in the pre-Socratic Anaxagoras but did not hold the same meaning as the modern
conception of the term. It did not appear as an attribute of God in the pre-Socratics
(excepting Anaxagoras), Plato, or the Stoics.39 As such, divine impassibility could not
have been taken over from the ancient Greeks, as is commonly claimed.40 In fact,
Aristotle’s successors in the Peripatetic school came to accept the importance of wellcontrolled feelings (metriopatheia), a distinction of which the early Church was aware.41
Even the Stoics, with whom the elimination of passions is most closely associated,
recognized value in eupatheiai—good emotions.42 The Fathers of the Church were unable
to import the idea from Greek philosophy at large because there was not consensus in
Greek philosophy to import—they would not have recognized a distinction “between the
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involved God of the Bible and the uninvolved God of the Hellenistic philosophers.”43
Additionally, Gavrilyuk draws out the patristic intention of the doctrine as an “apophatic
qualifier” used to protect the transcendence and the propriety of the emotional state of the
God of Scripture.44 The Christian God, in contrast to pagan gods, was free from “envy,
lust, and all selfish desires,” preserving a contrast between creator and creature.45 The
church was further able to maintain the dialectic of God as like humanity in one way
(“possessing certain emotionally coloured characteristics”) but entirely unlike humans in
another (impassible).46
While it is a convenient polemic to employ against proponents of impassibility, the
accusation of Greek corruption of early Christian theology becomes increasingly difficult
to sustain in the face of the evidence. For one, engagement with Greek philosophy can
already be seen in the text of the New Testament itself. The Logos Christology of John,
despite Harnack’s refusal to stomach a connection with the Greek philosophical Logos, is
quite clearly utilizing that already-existing phenomenon to describe Christian theology.
Additionally, Paul offers an implicit approval for the use of natural theology in his
discussion in Romans 1 as well as his Areopagus speech in Acts 17. While Barth’s famous
“Nein!” 47 might echo in our ears in response to such a claim, it seems clear that Paul is
employing natural reason in both instances. The extent to which God can be known
through nature in Romans 1 may be debated, but Paul is clear God can in some sense be
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known. Finally, the (admittedly debated) Platonic influence on the author of Hebrews
shows a canonized instance of engagement with Hellenistic philosophy.48 Of course, such
instances do not sacralize the entirety of the pre-Christian schools of philosophy, but they
do offer precedence for careful and nuanced engagement with modes of thinking that are
not Christian in origin.
In addition, the prospect of impassibility as a late infiltration of the pure Christian
thought introduced in the second century is dubious. Ignatius of Antioch writes in his
letter to Polycarp of the “impassible one” who became passible for the sake of humanity.49
Early church tradition names as Ignatius a acolyte of the apostle John, but even if this is
inaccurate, he was born in the first century (ca. 50 AD), placing him in close
chronological proximity to the apostles and those to whom they preached. If not John, it is
still likely he learned under those who were taught by the apostles or missionaries they
sent out. If the notion of an impassible God were completely antithetical to the revelation
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of God expounded in the apostolic witness, it would be quite surprising to find one so
close to the apostles invoking the doctrine.50

The God of the Machine
For a movement purportedly attuned to the historical influences overshadowing the
early Christian doctrine of God, the modern wave of theistic personalists does not give
much credence to the historical influences coloring their own thought. Two such
influences will be explored here: the rise of modern science and the influence of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on theology.51 The first is an under-explored aspect of the turn
toward theistic personalism—specifically, the loss of teleology in modern sciences. This
has been a topic of some recent debate in the philosophy of science, even from nontheistic philosophers.52 One of the most significant alterations in the course of modern
science was the loss of certain forms of causality. Prior to the modern era, much of
humanity’s understanding of the world relied on the Aristotelian notion of the “four
categories of causality,” namely material, formal, efficient, and final causation. 53 Briefly,
these entail
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1. The matter from which a given thing is created, including “prime matter” from
which everything is created (material cause).
2. The form which makes a material into the type of thing—such as chair or
cup—that it is, including the traits of that material (formal cause).
3. The agent who “brings form and matter together in a single substance,” such
as the chairmaker or potter (efficient cause).
4. The ultimate goal or end of that thing, such as supporting a human or
containing water (final cause).54
There was also, Hart argues, a fifth cause present in Christian metaphysics that he
terms the “ontological cause.” This cause is the cause of everything, solely able to create
ex nihilo and upon which all contingent things rely at every moment for their being.55 As
the scientific method developed, the notions of formal and final causation were set aside
due to the inability to investigate such things empirically. Instead, nature can be
investigated through a mechanical lens, with the scientist attending to the practical
ordering of disparate components and movements of the world. However, what began as a
matter of simple practicality lead to formal and final causation being eliminated entirely
from the prevailing view of the world, rather than simply set aside for the sake of
scientific investigation.56 As such, God became, even in the minds of some Christians,
something of a “supreme external efficient cause,” more compatible with the notion of a
demiurge.57
After this turn, the entire view of the universe was considerably altered for many.
No more was the world the dwelling place of a God who was both interior intimo meo and
superior summo meo. Under the old schema, all of creation was a sort of theophany, a
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revelation of the God who continually holds it in existence. After the causal shift, the
world became the product of a great mind who untied disparate parts and set them into
motion.58 The first views the world “as a reflection of God’s nature, open to transcendence
from within” while the latter views it as “a reflection only of divine power, and as closed
in upon itself.”59 Further, there was a move made in the Enlightenment period and
modernity to reject the use of revelation in discussing the philosophy of God. As Janet
Martin Soskice notes, this was not done by non-believers; instead, many theologians and
Christian philosophers were leading the charge, believing that the use of reason could
offer a stronger defense of the faith. Instead of securing the biblical God through the use
of reason, however, the attempt to locate God through purely human knowledge instead
undermined the notion of transcendence in Christian theology and thus led to “a collapse
of religious language into effective univocity.”60
Due to these factors, the conversation between Christian and atheist in the modern
period shifted from diametrically opposed positions to what amounted to a pair of
different atheistic visions of the world.61 Since neither truly understood God in the sense of
the eternal, timeless, transcendent source of being as classically conceived, it was easy for
God to become just one more optional piece of the cosmic puzzle rather than its ultimate
ground. Certainly, most theistic personalists do not conceive of God as a demiurge, but the
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thinking which removed God from his place as the transcendent creator and sustainer gave
rise to such alternative conceptions of God.

The Influence of Hegel
Another important factor in this discussion is the way modern theology has been
influenced by Hegel’s philosophical work. While the influence of Greek philosophy has
been maligned by the theologians mentioned above and many others, the Hegelian
influence on modern theology has been largely ignored. Some scholars have noted the
influence of Hegel on the theologians who followed him, but those who criticize the early
church for being influenced by its philosophical milieu have not taken steps to examine
the influence of Hegelian and process philosophy on their own work—it is likely an
unconscious bias for many, coming down through Hegelian-influenced theologians like
Karl Barth, Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Paul Tillich. Some scholars have
noted this influence in criticizing the theistic personalist camp, but there has not been a
great deal of attention paid to the topic.62
The renaissance of trinitarian theology in the twentieth century, though sometimes
attributed to its novel expression in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, was largely due
to Hegel’s “setting the stage,” as the key figures largely speak negatively of
Schleiermacher’s formulations.63 Hegel’s criticism of the Actus Purus of Thomas Aquinas
and demand for a greater dynamism within the being of God has become quite influential
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in modern times, as seen particularly in the work of those passibilists mentioned above.
Additionally, Hegel’s insistence on the life of God as “lived out through the life of the
world” is a common assumption in contemporary theology.64 The importation of this alien
philosophy into theology gives little pause to those who denounce the patristic usage of
philosophical terms despite its widespread and under-acknowledged influence.

The Question of Scripture
In the years since Gavrilyuk’s Suffering of the Impassible God was published,
passibilist theologians have found less recourse in the Hellenization thesis of their
forebearers. Many now acknowledge that the situation in early Christianity was not nearly
as simple as the vision set out by previous theologians (as summarized by Gavrilyuk
above). However, there has been another argument built in place of the previous one—that
is, that the early church was too influenced by philosophy in their exegesis of Scripture.
Under this reading, the early Christians may have redefined rather than adopted
uncritically philosophical concepts like impassibility, but their concern for the concepts
was still illegitimate as it was driven by philosophical motives. Rather than focusing on
the cross, such theologians charge, the early church sought to present an intellectually
acceptable philosophical system, and this betrayed the uniqueness of the Christian
revelation.65 This section will turn briefly to the question of theology and exegesis,
specifically in relation to the question of God’s impassibility. Such a question can be—
and is—itself the subject of numerous books. As such, this section will merely bring into
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question some of the exegetical assumptions made by those who use Scripture as a proof
against divine impassibility.
Primarily, such studies engage with the question of divine im/passibility without
stating the way in which Scripture is being used. Often, such criticisms launch into
polemic against the impassible God without offering a coherent doctrine of Scripture.66 As
such, many discussions between passibilists and impassiblists regarding the Scriptural
witness resort to the question of anthropomorphism—or, more exactly, anthropopathism.
Impassibilists claim Scriptures like those that depict God suffering, changing his mind,
and being moved to anger or joy are accommodations of God to humanity, just as the
discussion of God’s finger writing the ten commandments (Ex. 31:18), or God “coming
down” to survey the goings-on at the tower of Babel (Gen. 11:5), or God walking in the
garden (Gen. 3:8) are anthropomorphic, since elsewhere Scripture attests that “God is
spirit” (Jn. 4:24). While this is a legitimate course to pursue, the argument has reached
something of a stalemate, with an insistence from the passibilists that depictions of God’s
emotions should be taken literally as a separate phenomenon and the impassibilist
insisting it should not. Those defending impassibility insist such arguments could easily be
used to defend God as embodied while those defending passibility insist the
overwhelming biblical evidence supports divine passibility and to deny such a notion is to
blatantly reject the testimony of Scripture.67

66

One notable exception is John C. Peckham, The Love of God: A Canonical Model (Downers Grove:
IVP Academic, 2014) which devotes a chapter to the use of Scripture in his understanding. This work is not
solely against impassibility but does contain a criticism and rejection of the doctrine.
This can be seen in the presentation and responses in James E. Dolezal, “Strong Impassibility,”
Divine Impassibility: Four Views of God’s Emotions and Suffering, ed. Robert J. Matz and A. Chadwick
Thornhill (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2019), 13-52.
67

71
There are several observations to be made here that may be able to break the
stalemate between the two. To begin with, there are two distinct approaches to Scripture
undertaken without a recognition of the differences. The passibilist camp generally views
Scripture as expressing God’s relation to creation in a fairly straightforward way—so,
when God is said to be angered or saddened or move to rejoice at the actions of his people,
such events are understood as indicating real changes which take place within God’s
person. Not only do the authors of Scripture reveal the workings of God in relation to
persons, but they communicate who God is in himself. Understanding Scripture as
inspired by God grants this notion credibility, as God could conceivably reveal himself as
he is to the authors of Scripture. However, it must be asked if this is precisely what
Scripture is seeking to do. It does not seem apparent that this is the case. Scripture appears
to be not so much a metaphysical textbook explaining the intricacies of God’s nature as it
does an account of God’s relation to his people. To illustrate this, we can observe a lack of
consistency on the possibility of God changing within the text of Scripture itself. God is
said both to repent (Gen. 6:5-7, 1 Sam. 15:11) and to be incapable of repenting (1 Sam.
15:29).68 To claim one clear biblical teaching on the matter fails to recognize the diverse
witness of Scripture. These images are useful in the context of the narratives in which they
appear for communicating truths about human experience and interaction with the divine.
So also are notions of God grieving at the sin of his people or being moved to joy at their
repentance.
Of course, there are metaphysical and theological claims to which the Christian
view of God and the world must adhere: God created everything ex nihilo, sin entered
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God’s good creation, God loves his creation, God became incarnate through Jesus, God
will secure a eschatological victory over evil through the work of the Son and Spirit, to
name a few. However, this does not entail that each account given of God is an insight
into the precise metaphysical being of God. A story or poem can contain truth in the
ultimate sense even if it does not provide an entirely accurate description of what occurred
historically. As Robert Barron has said, asking the question, “is Scripture true?” is akin to
asking, “is a library true?”69 The latter question is incoherent on its face because it cannot
be answered in the same way for the entirety of a library. Books of fiction are clearly not
“true” in sense that they tell of events that happened in history, but they can be true in the
sense that they disclose truths about the world and about reality—the goodness of
sacrifice, the pain of loss, the joy of attaining a goal to which one has worked diligently.
Poetry works in a similar way. The history section of the library may be able to be
measured on its historical truth or falsity, but that also insinuates a modern understanding
of history-telling in which the ultimate goal is to recount events precisely as they occurred.
The Bible can be viewed as a library of inspired texts—indeed, for much of
Christian history (due primarily to the limitations of manuscript technology) the Bible was
passed down as a library, or at least as a multivolume collection of texts.70 Though the
current single-volume nature of Scripture is a boon in many ways, from availability for the
laity to the convenience in transporting it to the mission field, it can lead Christians to
understand the Bible not as a collection of texts by various inspired authors but as one text
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delivered from heaven, written by the finger of God. Instead, Scripture should be viewed
in its proper place: poetry as communicating divine truth in poetic form, prophecy as
communicating God’s will for how his people should conduct themselves, history as a—
particularly Ancient Near Eastern—description of past events. For instance, though many
passibilists would maintain that the depictions of God as embodied in the Old Testament
are metaphorical,71 it is likely that their view was not shared by ancient Israel.72 If we can
acknowledge that the Israelites likely conceived of God as corporeal but we can now
acknowledge that their understanding was limited or flawed, it does not seem
unreasonable to assume they conceived of God in passibilist terms but we can understand
God as impassible. It is not a denigration of the biblical authors to make this suggestion,
particularly since they are not attempting to offer a metaphysical description of God’s
nature. Most importantly for this project, encounters between God and humanity should be
understood as humans attempting to communicate an interaction between the infinite and
the finite, as imperfect humans expressing an encounter with the inconceivable, ineffable,
transcendent creator God. The God expressed here is one who exists in eternity and acts in
temporal moments.73 As such, discussions of God changing his mind or being moved to
this or that emotion by the actions of creatures should not be taken as literal depictions of
what occurs within God. This is not to say that nothing about God can be gleaned from
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these passages. On the contrary, descriptions God refraining from destroying Israel or
becoming angered at sin serve to underscore his great mercy or the seriousness of sin.
Understanding the theological consequences of the biblical account can be taken to
establish the truth of impassibility from the text of Scripture. For instance, the nature of
creation ex nihilo makes certain demands on the understanding of God. The notion that
God creates everything from nothing leads to an affirmation of divine simplicity, as the
reliance on discrete parts would make God reducible to those parts and would set those
parts of God as responsible for the creation of the world.74 Creation ex nihilo recognizes
what Sokolowski refers to as “the Christian distinction,” 75 expressed in the course of
Christian theology through the centuries. This distinction centers around what is referred
to above as God’s “noncompetitive” or “noncontrastive” transcendence—the notion that
God is not merely to be understood as being transcendent in opposition to the world (i.e.
unchanging vs. changing) but being altogether beyond such opposition. This God creates
the world without use of intermediaries, because he is interior intimo meo et superior
summo meo. He can be involved in the most minute and intimate aspects of creation while
withholding himself from being tarnished by its sin. Non-Christian philosophy need not be
cited to affirm this notion—in fact, this was put forth by Christians to solve a problem that
pagan philosophy could not! The noncompetitive transcendence of God is demanded by
the Christian story in which God is intimately involved in his creation and ultimately
becomes part of it in order to redeem it. The God who can “become part of the world…
without disrupting the integrity of the world,” must be a God who is not “one of the kinds

74

This is argued capably in Chance Juliano, "Divine Simplicity as a Necessary Condition for
Affirming Creation Ex Nihilo" (master’s thesis, Abilene Christian University, 2019).
75

Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason, 21.

75
of being in the world.”76 The confession of the incarnation is foundational for establishing
a God who is impassible, as impassibility protects the noncompetitive transcendence of
God.
Another place that leads to an understanding of the nature of God as defined in this
project is in the giving of the divine name. When God speaks to Moses from the burning
bush, he offers the name YHWH: “I AM WHO I AM” (Exod. 3:14). The tradition of the
divine name as a source for theology is strong in the Christian tradition, appearing in the
work of theologians such as Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Thomas Aquinas.77 For
them, the divine name was an insight into who God is: he is being itself. To say “God
exists” is redundant: God is, by definition, existence itself.78 From this understanding
flows the classical understanding of God: simple, immutable, impassible, omnipresent,
transcendent. Eternality also follows naturally if God is who he is.79 Thus, when Jesus
claims, “before Abraham was, I AM,” (Jn. 8:58) he claims the divine name and its
prerogatives. Contemporary scholarship, however, has argued against this understanding.
Finding warrant for theology proper in the divine name draws accusations of
“Platonizing”80 the text, allowing ancient philosophy to shift the meaning from a promise
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of God’s faithful presence with Israel to “a metaphysical definition in the abstract of
God’s essence.”81
However, as D. Stephen Long argues, there is much more to the tradition of the
divine names than unthinking deference to the Platonic milieu. In fact, those who read the
theological tradition of the divine names in such a way are themselves standing within a
tradition of interpretation which fully accepts the Hellenization thesis—a problematic
position, as this chapter has already shown.82 As Long notes,83 Augustine himself speaks
against this Hellenizing accusation. Augustine claims he once thought of God in
Aristotelian categories but was freed of this when he became a Christian.84 The usage of
the divine name here is invoked to protect against Aristotelian categories: Augustine holds
that God’s essence is his existence, which means God cannot have attributes in an
Aristotelian sense.85 Indeed, as Michael Allen has shown, Augustine’s analysis of the
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divine name is closely attentive to questions of narrative theology and apophaticism.
These gleanings are quite like the readings several biblical scholars—from diverse
backgrounds and theological commitments—have offered of Exodus 3:14.86
In addition, Catholic theologian Thomas Weinandy offers several “bridges” from
Scripture to the patristic doctrine of God in his work Does God Suffer? After a chapter on
the Old Testament God’s relation to impassibility, Weinandy examines two key bridges:
the New Testament text and Philo of Alexandria.87. Though Philo’s interpretation of the
Old Testament was very influential on patristic thought, Weinandy’s exposition on the
bridge from the New Testament is more relevant to this project. In his examination of the
New Testament, Weinandy draws on passages like Paul’s exposition on natural theology
in Romans 1 and Paul’s speech in the Areopagus in Acts 17 as well as Paul’s contrast of
the false pagan gods with the reality of the one true God in 1 Corinthians 8. Additionally,
he draws on the words of Jesus in the Gospels, such as when he calls the Father good
(Matt. 19:17; Mk. 19:18; Lk. 18:19) and perfect (Matt. 5:48) and exhorts his followers to
imitate this perfection. These interactions provide a bridge from the New Testament to the
philosophical conception of God and legitimize the theology of the patristics which follow
these lines of thought. Of course, the patristics did not uncritically accept these
conceptions. The idea of God as creator “baptized” Platonism, and therefore while the
Fathers maintained their perception of God as Other and so affirmed their version of
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impassibility, they also conceived of God as personal and intimately involved with his
creation.88

Conclusion
Harnack’s thesis has been widely discounted by much of the recent work done in
historical theology, but its influence can still be seen today. It appears in a number of
theologians who continue to criticize the influence of Greek philosophy on early Christian
theology. This assertion has several problems, including the way it depicts the view of
divine emotions in Hellenistic philosophy. Further, the underlying philosophical
influences of modern theologians, such as the shift brought about by the Enlightenment
and the influence of Hegel, are largely ignored. Finally, the method such theologians use
to read Scripture has significant difficulties due to a lack of recognition both of the diverse
ways God is portrayed in Scripture and the exegetical strategies employed. For these
reasons, among others, Harnack’s thesis and its subsequent theological inheritors fail to
strike a blow against divine impassibility.
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Chapter Five
The Relational Question

An important criticism of impassibility is the insistence by its detractors that it
makes God’s relation to the world and its inhabitants impossible. If God is radically
transcendent of the world and cannot be moved by the actions of humans, how can he be
said to be in relationship with individual persons or communities like Israel or the
church? Further, if God does not feel emotions like humans do, how can there be any
relation between God and humanity? In relationships, humans experience pleasure,
disappointment, excitement, sorrow, and a variety of other emotions due to the actions of
others. If God does not suffer these, it is argued, a relationship with him bears little
difference from a relationship to a beautiful statue. We can admire its beauty and
grandeur, but it is stoic and immobile in response. This chapter will examine some underexplored aspects of the conversations around impassibility and God’s relation to the
world before laying out the objection and formulating a response.

A Case of “Impassible” Human Action
The case of Jo Cameron might be a useful one in understanding the how one can
be relational without enduring the other’s suffering. Cameron, a retired schoolteacher in
Scotland, displays what can be understood as very close to a human expression of
impassibility. Of course, this is not to say her experience is the same as God’s—this work
has cautioned against such an understanding of God. However, her case is a significant
analogue for this phenomenon. Cameron is one of the rare individuals in the world who
cannot feel physical pain. However, in contrast to others who cannot feel physical pain,
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she is largely immune to emotional distress as well. Rather than becoming a moral
monster—as personalists describe the notion of an impassible God—Cameron is, by the
account of those around her, a remarkably kind, patient, and compassionate person. She
does not lose her temper, she is not prone to emotional distress in the face of pain—she
knows pain, she says, as an abstract notion, but has not experienced it. But she knows
when others are in pain and makes it her responsibility to help them. When her son
suffered serious injuries following an assault at a bar, she recalls thinking “Oh, God, I
hope he doesn’t die” but after getting into the car to drive the roughly 130 miles to the
hospital where he had been taken, she was not “fretting;” her only thought was “We’ve
got to get to him, he needs me.”1 This is not to assert that God experiences relationships
in this way, but it certainly runs counter to the passibilist assertion that God must suffer
in order to be in relationship with humanity.

Impassibility and the Rise of Sympathy
Jennifer A. Herdt traces the beginning of divine sympathy—the concept of God as
co-sufferer with humans—to the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century.2 The
shift had previously been recognized as a primarily (and almost exclusively) Anglican
phenomenon at its inception3 but Herdt was among the first to trace its influence to
specific persons. She initially focuses on the influential Cambridge Platonist Ralph
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Cudworth (1617-1688) who postulated divine sympathy as a counter to Thomas
Hobbes’s mechanistic universe.4 His efforts to oppose the materialism of Hobbes on one
hand and the dualism of Descartes on the other led him to posit divine sympathy as the
link between God and his creation, especially humankind.5 Cudworth implied in some
places that God is unchanging, and the various ways a person experiences God are a
matter of that person’s heart. Thus, the unchanging God could be a comforter to the
faithful Christian but a terror to the sinner.6 However, Cudworth ultimately went beyond
such an understanding. He championed God’s “vitall [sic] sympathy” with “all that came
out from him” over against those “Dry speculators” who would posit “Apathy in the
Deity” and thus “make God no better than a marble Statue.”7
The attempt to balance a God who possessed this sympathy with the need to
maintain God’s transcendence as the one who sovereignly upholds creation forced
Cudworth into a series of compromise and contradiction.8 In contrast to his arguments
against apathy in God, he denied God’s sympathy entailed passion stirred by anything
outside of God but was instead an “active perception of his own Energy.”9 In other words,
God (as being-itself) was stirred by his own presence in creation. Thus, he was not acted
on by something other than himself, but instead was a passive actor only in relation to
himself. This is a creative solution that attends to concerns of passibilists and
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impassiblists, but it greatly blurs the line between creator and creature.10 His efforts to
properly delineate this understanding led Cudworth to defend an idea of the world as an
emanation of God rather than something fashioned from nothing.11 This naturally led to a
univocity between God and the world, limiting divine transcendence and reviving the
problems already solved by God’s noncontrastive transcendence.12
Many Latitudinarian divines studied under the Cambridge Platonists and carried
their ideas into the academy and the Anglican church, leading to the rise of “sympathy as
a morally important concept.”13 Not only did Cudworth’s use of “sympathy” mark a
theological turn, it also marked a turn in the English language, though not one as
exclusive to him as his theological move. While “sympathy” was originally used to
express “a hidden affinity between things” and to “explain their mutual influence,” its use
to express an experience entering into another’s sufferings can only be traced back to
1662.14 With such a heritage, it is no surprise that Anglican theologians were among the
first to reject divine impassibility in favor of a suffering God.

The Criticism
Francis House offers a fairly succinct proposal of the “involvement” criticism in
examining a series of poets and artists who found impassibility as a “barrier” to belief in
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God.15 There is some overlap between the criticisms on offer here and those in the
theodicy question. However, in keeping with the question of this chapter the framing here
will focus on divine action in the world than on the question of theodicy. House cites
voices both inside and outside the church in their full-throated rejection of the aloof deity
he believes impassibility entails. Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth, though it does not
mention impassibility, clearly reflects the doctrine in her writings as she rejects a God
who is “untouched” by human suffering in the wake of the horrors of World War I.16
Within the church, Geoffrey Studdert-Kennedy in his poem “High and Lifted Up,”
rejected the “stained-glass window representations” of an “aloof” God reining over the
world.17
Following William Temple, House calls for a destruction of the “idol” of
“Aristotle’s ‘apathetic God’” that has held a tight grip on the minds of Christians.18 The
solution to this misguided belief is an understanding of God’s love as “self-giving
sacrificial love.”19 This sort of God can break the barrier to belief and leave behind the
notion which was “taken-over from non-Christian philosophy.”20 There is also a pastoral
component to his understanding, as he believes that the movement into understanding
God’s love as self-giving and sacrificial would offer a challenge to Christians to live into
the self-giving love of God. Not only would it remove a barrier to belief, adopting this
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new notion of divine love would engender a greater commitment to the task of Christian
living in the world.21
Kenneth Surin offers another example of this position, expressing deep concerns
over the activity of an impassible God:
For the notion that God can only experience the sufferings of his creatures
indirectly is incompatible with the fundamental Christian assertion that God is
love. All real responding must involve sympathetic relationship; otherwise we
would be justified, like Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, in ‘handing back our
tickets’ (to heaven) to this deity. God, in the role of passive onlooker, was absent
in Auschwitz or Cambodia. The very principle of the incarnation — that God
became man — presupposes that God can experience suffering.22
For Surin (and many others) the notion of a God who does not suffer is the understanding
of a God who does not love and is unconcerned with the goings-on in his creation. An
impassible God is so unworthy of devotion that one can righteously refuse entry into
heaven—one should refuse the gift of eternity from this God, much less offer this God
worship. Is there any recourse for a proponent of impassibility in the face of these
accusations? Perhaps Surin’s own dilemma can help guide the answer to this objection:
“Either, God, if he loves us, must participate in our destinies; or, he is perfect, in which
case this participation (so it is alleged) cannot be real.” 23 Can an impassible God
participate in the course of human life?
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The Involvement of the Classical God
In answering the question of the impassible God’s involvement in the world, it is
helpful to turn to some of the other aspects of classical theism with which impassibility is
intertwined. Though not all who hold to impassibility would accept the other core tenants
of classical theism,24 most do, and the action of the impassible God on the world as
defended in this project is related to these other facets of the classical God. One
significant aspect of the classical tradition in this respect is the notion of participation.
The metaphysics of participation insist that, because God is the source of all being and
the transcendent one who is interior intimo meo and superior summo meo, everything that
exists relies on God not only for the beginning of its existence but to continually hold it
in existence. There is an "ontological dependence” on an external source and each thing
has its existence “with and indeed after and in pursuit of, another… [it is] by virtue of
something other than itself.”25 This understanding allows finite things to maintain their
integrity without capitulating to a framework in which there exists some space
independent of God.26 Participation has significant implications for theology as it offers
support for the notion of theosis: the ultimate end of a person—indeed, of all things—is
in God. As Augustine says at the start of his Confessions, “you have made us for
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yourselves, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”27 The telos of a human person is
to move from the participation in God shared by all by virtue of existence to a
participation in the triune God through the Christian life. For the purpose of this topic,
however, it is the divine participation in the world that is more important. This notion
supports God’s involvement in the world as it asserts not that God is far off and removed
from the world but that every being by its very existence is in some way participating in
God. The loss of this understanding of God and the world—whether it stems, as the
proponents of Radical Orthodoxy suggest, from the work of Duns Scotus and William of
Ockham28 or at some later point—made the classical understanding of God much less
viable.
Herbert McCabe, attempting to recover this notion, gives a strong alternate
account of God in the world. He begins by briefly answering the question of the “Greek
influence” on Scripture in a similar vein as I have above but with a specific link to the
questions of interest to the Ancient Jewish mind. These are the questions of “what” and
“why”: “what does it all mean?” and “why anything instead of nothing?”29 These
questions are characteristically Jewish, and do not concern the Greeks. Aristotle, for
instance, did not have a notion of creation as such since he believed the matter from
which the material world was fashioned was eternal and did not believe the universe had
a temporal beginning.30 There is no conception of a creation from nothing in his thought.
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As McCabe observes, the usage of Aristotelian (or Platonic, or Stoic) concepts by
Christians does not entail that Aristotle would approve of everything Christian authors
say, any more than Marx would approve of everything liberation theologians using
Marxist categories would say.31 The God of Augustine and Aquinas is the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob because they sought to understand God in a way that could
give full force to the implications of the biblical account—a God who was involved in the
world and yet was the creator ex nihilo. God’s participation in the being of persons as the
transcendent and immanent one solves this dilemma.
Though many suggest sympathy as an essential aspect of a proper response to
suffering, it is (as has been expressed in multiple places above) misguided to apply this
requirement to the responsive love of God. One reason for this is that the one who
displays sympathy or compassion is always removed from the suffering to which he or
she is responding. The sort of “suffering with” another that is encouraged for humans is
never a true involvement in the suffering of the other person, but instead a capacity to
have an awareness of the person’s pain as well as feelings of pity and concern.32 This is
not the case for God. Our attempts at sympathy or compassion are ever only attempts to
act in one moment as God acts in every moment: fully united with the life of the
sufferer.33 Since God is the creator and sustainer of all, he cannot be so removed from the
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sufferer as to undergo something like sympathy. Sympathy is too distant for God. God
“has no need of compassion… he is ‘closer to the sufferer than she is to herself.’”34
This notion can be extended from compassion to serve as a rule for “all
experience and learning.”35 Humans, McCabe argues, are ignorant if we do not learn, but
the same is not true for God. God is not an individual who is subject to experience: this
would put him in some way dependent on the thing acting upon him for his experience.
But acting as creator adds nothing to God—it is an act of almost pure altruism for God,
excepting that the “goodness God wills for his creatures is not a separate and distinct
goodness from his own goodness.”36 God is “at the heart of every creature” and as such
cannot be “other” to humans in the same way they are to one another.37 E.L. Mascall
expresses a similar understanding:
God is immanent in the depth of the soul and it is there that he is to be found, But
he is immanent there, not as contained in it, but rather as containing it; not in the
sense that he is limited and restricted by man, but in the sense that man, at the
very root of his being, is altogether dependent upon God. God, then, is immanent,
but the unveiling of this immanent God is not the work of man.38
Thus, it is both true that suffering is foreign to God’s nature and that God must be more
intimately involved in the suffering of his creatures than they ever could be with one
another.39 Beyond this, however, God does enter the world through the incarnation.
McCabe views the Chalcedonian definition as an essential confession for God’s
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involvement in the world. God does not suffer along with humanity—instead he suffers
as a human. The suffering of God is not that of divinity suffering in a removed way but a
suffering that enters the suffering of humanity fully and yet, as the impassible God, is
entirely unblemished by it. The God who is eternally who he is, perfect in every way,
present fully in every moment and in all existence, also became incarnate and suffered as
a human. There is no greater involvement in the pain of the world than that of the
classical Christian God.40
Another aspect of the classical understanding of God that is important for action
in the world is God’s eternality, and it offers a further explanation of how an impassible
God can act in the world. Boethius offers the classical definition of divine eternity: “the
whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of boundless life.”41 There is a significant
issue in modern discourse around divine eternity, as much of (particularly analytic)
philosophical theology treats God’s eternity as a sort of “temporal moment devoid of
duration” rather than “a timeless fullness of presence.”42 In other words, the critic of
divine eternity treats God’s eternity as confined in time, just a time separate from what
humans experience. Divine eternity does not entail, as detractors allege, that all moments
must be simultaneous with one another if they are simultaneous for God because time is
present to the infinite and transcendent God in a radically different way than for finite
creatures.43 We can comprehend this in a limited sense—the day of my baptism and the
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1963 March on Washington are both in some sense present for me now in that I am
thinking of them both, but they are not thus chronologically concurrent.44
Eleonore Stump has worked to provide an understanding of how an eternal and
impassible God can work in the temporal world through examining the narrative of
Jonah, where God converses with Jonah (Jonah 1:2; 4:2-4, 9-11), causes a fish to swallow
and then spit out Jonah (1:17; 2:10), declares judgement on Nineveh (3:4), relents of his
judgement (3:10), and causes a plant to rise and wither (4:6-7). This is a great deal of
action and involvement in the world—how can a God outside of time break into the
world like this? How can the immutable and omniscient God be said to change his mind?
Anthropomorphism is, of course, in play here. Stump, however, offers an understanding
of how God could be experienced by Jonah as acting in these ways.
Stump begins with a helpful analogy about a two-dimensional creature inhabiting
a two-dimensional world from Erwin Abbot’s story Flatland:
In Flatland, one of these two-dimensional creatures, a sentient square, comes into
conversation with a sentient sphere, who is an inhabitant of a three-dimensional
world. The sphere has a terrible time explaining his three-dimensional world to
his new friend, the two-dimensional square. As Flatland presents things, there is
more than one mode of spatial existence for sentient beings. There is both the
Flatland two-dimensional mode of spatial existence and the three-dimensional
mode of spatial existence. That the sentient sphere is in the three-dimensional
space does not mean that the sentient square of Flatland is really somehow threedimensional or that the square’s mode of spatial existence somehow really has
any of the three-dimensional characteristics of the sphere’s mode of existence. In
the story, the two spatial modes of existence…are both real; and neither is
reducible to the other or to any third thing.45
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This understanding provides a helpful analogue to divine eternity. For the classical
tradition, temporal and eternal “modes of duration” are included in reality and are not
reducible to each other or a third thing. However, it is possible for those in these differing
modes to interact with one another.46
In offering a solution to this dilemma, Stump notes that because God’s eternal
existence includes a limitless and atemporal presence, God’s relation to things in time
must entail simultaneity. She invokes the notion, which she developed with Norman
Kretzmann, of “ET-simultaneity,” which is “simultaneity between what is eternal and
what is temporal.”47 Because those operating in time and in eternity have separate modes
of existence, the ET-simultaneity “will be neither reflexive nor transitive.”48 As such, two
(or more) events in time may be ET-simultaneous with one eternal event without
entailing ET-simultaneity with one another.49 To illustrate this point, Stump returns to the
Flatland example: if the entirety of Flatland were “finite and linearly ordered with an
absolute middle,” it would be possible for all of Flatland to appear before a human who
could then observe every point along the linear plot, and “all of Flatland could be here at
once.”50 But it would not be the case that all of Flatland is “here” for an inhabitant of
Flatland—one small part of Flatland could be here for its resident while the entirety of
Flatland is here for the human observer. Just as Flatland in this example is
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“metaphysically smaller” than human reality, our reality is metaphysically smaller than
the infinite eternity in which God exists.51
Thus, God can act timelessly at time T1, which is ET-simultaneous for him, in
order to have his purpose occur in the world. However, since all times are simultaneous
for God, God can also act at a prior time T2 to bring about an effect in the world at time
T3 and fulfill his purposes.52 This follows with the notion of divine simplicity and the
understanding of God’s being as one pure divine act. This act, like the divine essence, can
be analogized as a pure beam of light refracted through a prism and appearing throughout
time as God’s speech, God’s guiding of the world, and God’s self-disclosure. These
would all serve as manifestations of the one divine act.53 This act is a perfect willing of
the course of the world, into which is woven the free decisions of creatures. The story of
Jonah is helpful for explaining how God acts in this way. God, existing in the eternal
now, is ET-simultaneous with every moment in Jonah’s life. Because of this, God’s one
divine act can place a conversation with Jonah on the day he commissions his mission to
Nineveh at time T1 while also conversing with Jonah as he sits under a withered plant at
time T2. Both are aspects of the one divine act by the God who is always eternally present
in the lives of his creations.54
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Conclusion
This understanding of all being existing by a donation of being from God and God
as eternally present in each moment gives rise to a greater involvement than any
understanding of God as time bound. The God who knows his children in their present
but also knows them and is ET-simultaneously present to their infancy and death and
each moment in between can love greater than the God who does not know what his child
will become in the future. This God can make the promise:
Listen to me, O house of Jacob,
all the remnant of the house of Israel,
who have been borne by me from your birth,
carried from the womb;
even to your old age I am he,
even when you turn gray I will carry you.
I have made, and I will bear;
I will carry and will save.
(Isaiah 46:3-4)
He can make this promise because he is present in the moment of the promise, in the
moment of each Israelite in the womb, and at the end of their lives when they are old and
gray. He is there and he is intimately involved.
God’s involvement and presence is in no way that of a distant observer.
Impassibility does not make God uninvolved and unresponsive, if it is connected to a
larger, fuller doctrine of God. In isolation, certain understandings of the doctrine may
give this impression. However, connecting them to the full confession Christians wish to
make about God reveals such critiques to be strawmen against a full understanding of
impassibility. The doctrine is one that does not preclude God from being fully present—
but it does prevent him from being altered or otherwise injured by an encounter with the
world’s evil. Because of his impassibility God is present and involved, but never injured.
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As Ron Highfield has put it: “Because God’s hands are not busy wiping his own tears,
they are free to wipe away ours.”55
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Conclusion

The primary aim of this work has been to establish a definition of divine
impassibility which could then be defended against several objections which have arisen
in recent decades. Towards this end, impassibility was defined as God’s being beyond
suffering, being free from being acted on by creatures, and being free from the influence
of evil. This definition did not exclude something like an emotional state in God or his
ability to act in the world, but it recognizes evil has no ontological status and God is free
from being diverted from bringing about his good ends for the world. Impassibility was
also connected to the larger doctrine of God, including the notion of God’s simultaneous
transcendence and immanence, which is crucial for this project. The role of impassiblity
in the incarnation of Jesus was also examined, and it was argued that God does indeed
suffer on the cross through the communicatio idiomatum—not as God, but as a human.
The second chapter took up the theodicy objection, which demands that God
suffer with humanity in order to make sense of the world’s evil. This was answered
through elucidating the disastrous implications of God’s love being forged through
commerce with evil, offering an understanding of the world’s evil which does not
implicate God in the evil actions of creatures, and offering an alternative understanding
of love which does not include fellow-suffering. The third chapter examined the
historical objection, which names impassibility as a corruption of Christian theology by
Greek philosophy. This was answered by pointing out some of the historical errors made
by proponents of this Hellenization thesis and by giving an alternate understanding of
Scripture and its interpretation to those who accuse the early Christians of being too
“Greek” in their reading of Scripture. The fourth chapter took up the question of God’s
95
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involvement over against those who insist impassibility makes God distant and
uninvolved in creation. This was answered through an appeal to the metaphysics of
participation and through an understanding of how an eternal God can act in the world.
This study has not answered every possible objection to the doctrine of divine
impassibility, but it has answered some important contemporary objections. Those in the
camp of process theology were not addressed in this discussion, and their understanding
of divine passibility would raise some objections other than the ones addressed here.
However, the doctrine as expressed in this project is, I believe, sufficient to withhold
objections from that camp as well as it is the ultimate form of theistic personalism—
rejecting traditional notions of omnipotence, omniscience, and eternality so as to make
God a powerful but not all-powerful creature.
The only question that remains, it seems, is whether Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s
declaration, “only a suffering God can help,”1 holds true. From the arguments already laid
forth in the second chapter regarding suffering divinity, the proper answer seems
apparent. When one calls upon God for rescue from suffering, she is not hoping for
someone to come down and suffer alongside her—particularly not if (as David Bentley
Hart argues) God is the ontological ground of her suffering. Instead, she is calling upon
the one who, as creator and sustainer of all that is, dwells constantly and personally
within and around her, is intimately aware of her suffering and can, whether it be now or
at the end of all things, rescue her from that which is causing her to suffer, all without
disturbing the transcendent perichoretic peace which he perpetually enjoys within his
own being. This is the beauty of the gospel: God can overcome, God has overcome, and
1
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God will overcome. God does not need to come down to suffer alongside us; we need to
be drawn up to him to share in his impassible peace and unending joy.
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